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ABSTRACT
In the first chapter, we unveil a feedback loop between monetary policy, housing tenure choice
(own vs rent) and measured inflation and quantify its consequences. This feedback loop is
explained in three parts: i) Housing rents respond positively to contractionary monetary
policy shocks; ii) This effect of interest rates on housing rents gives rise to an important and
systematic inflation mismeasurement problem because, directly and indirectly, housing rents
weigh approximately 30% in the CPI and 13% in the PCE; iii) When interest rates are set
according to a Taylor rule, the systematic mismeasurement of inflation gives rise to a feedback
loop by which the monetary authority keeps setting interest rates too high (low) because
inflation is apparently too high (low). To rationalize i) and quantify the importance of iii)
we propose a standard New Keynesian model augmented with an endogenous housing tenure
choice mechanism. Using a calibrated version of the model, we do a counterfactual exercise
and estimate that, when the monetary authority targets the implied consumer price index net
of housing rents instead of the implied consumer price index, the loss function of monetary
policy is 14.5% lower and the welfare in terms of consumption equivalent variation is 0.9%
higher. Finally, analysing the same alternative scenario for the 1983-2006 US experience, we
find that the standard deviation of housing prices and nominal inflation would have been
24.8% and 19.9% lower, respectively.
In the second chapter, we provide an alternative explanation for the price puzzle (Sims
1992) based on the effect of monetary policy on housing tenure choice and the weight of
the shelter component in overall CPI. In the presence of nominal or financial frictions, when
interest rates increase, the real cost of owning a house increases, and this increase may make
some people prefer to rent instead of buying. This change in consumption behavior increases
the price of rents relative to other goods. Starting in 1983, homeownership costs are based
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on a measure of implied owner equivalent rent, which is calculated using observed house
rents. This change implies that, directly and indirectly, prices in the rental market almost
entirely command the shelter component of CPI, which weighs around 30% in the overall
index. When we take these two pieces into account and use CPI net of shelter services
as a measure of inflation, we obtain impulse responses of prices to a monetary contraction
shock more in line with what is predicted by theory. In addition, our results also suggest that
inflation is much less persistent than what is implied by analyses using a measure of inflation
that includes shelter services. Our results pass a long list of robustness check exercises and
compare well against other explanations of the price puzzle.
Finally in the third chapter, we investigate the observed differences in the service sector’s
labor productivity between Europe and the US. The objective of this chapter is to identify
factors that can explain such differences. Our approach to identify these factors is two-folded.
First, we break down the service sector and extend a standard structural transformation
model of Duarte and Restuccia (2010) to investigate how the structural transformation
within the service sector affects the labor productivity of the service sector. We show that a
compositional analyses of the service sector reveals that the differences in the service sector’s
productivity between different Europe and the US are the result of differences in the labor
productivity of trade, food and accommodation, transportation, storage and communication.
Second, we explore the EU KLEMS data set to empirically investigate if differences in
labor market regulation help explain the differences in the service sector’s productivity. Our
preliminary results suggest that labor market regulation is negatively correlated with service
labor productivity.
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CHAPTER 1
HOUSING AND MONETARY POLICY IN THE
BUSINESS CYCLE: WHAT DO HOUSING RENTS
HAVE TO SAY?
1.1 Introduction
Since the 2007/2008 financial crisis the efforts to better understand the links between
housing and the macroeconomy have been enormous and a large amount of new research has
been produced since then. The bulk of the literature on housing and the macroeconomy has
focused almost entirely on the role of house prices on different economic outcomes such as
output, consumption or financial stability. Interestingly, housing rents, which are obviously
related to house prices, have been, to the best of our knowledge, completely overlooked.
In this paper, we fill this gap in the literature and unveil and quantify the importance
of a new link between monetary policy and the housing market that operates through the
effect of monetary policy on housing rents and vice-versa. Before explaining this channel of
monetary policy, we must first introduce a new stylized fact regarding the effect of monetary
policy on housing rents, and highlight the importance of housing rents in the most commonly
used measures of inflation, the consumer price index (CPI) and the personal consumption
expenditures (PCE) price index.
New stylized fact: we show housing rents respond positively to contractionary monetary
policy shocks using SVAR and FAVAR models and structural shock identification techniques
on US data. Specifically, we find that when the federal funds rate is raised by 25 basis points,
housing rents increase by 1.22% after five years. Our empirical findings are obtained in the
context of empirical models that also include house prices, which were already known to
respond negatively to contractionary monetary policy shocks (Iacoviello (2005), Del Negro
Joint work with Daniel A. Dias.
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and Otrok (2007)). Hence, it is surprising that housing rents increase when income, other
sale prices and housing prices fall after that same unexpected increase in interest rates.
One possible explanation for these two apparently conflicting results, house prices declining
while house rents increase in response to a contractionary monetary policy shock, is the
effect that monetary policy may have on housing tenure decisions (own vs. rent). If for
some reason the prices of houses and rents do not adjust quickly enough to its new long-run
nominal level after a contractionary monetary policy shock, the relative costs of owning vs.
renting will change, and this will lead to some people switching from one type of tenure to
the other. In support of this interpretation, we show that after a contractionary monetary
policy shock rental vacancy rates, homeownership rates and housing starts decline while
homeowner vacancy rates increase.
Importance of housing rents in the CPI or PCE: since the adoption of the owner equivalent
rent (OER) estimate in 1983 as a measure of shelter costs faced by homeowners that live in
their own house, that the direct and indirect weight of housing rents in the CPI has been over
20%, and currently surpassing 30%. In the case of PCE, which uses the same information
coming from the housing rental market, the current weight of shelter in the overall index
is lower than in the case of CPI and is just slightly above 13% of the total index. 1 The
reason why housing rents have such a large weight on total CPI and total PCE is because
in the estimation of the OER the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) uses information from
the housing rental market to impute rental prices to houses that are owner-occupied (see
BLS CPI methodology (2009) for more details on this procedure). Reflective of this is the
fact that the correlation between the year-on-year growth rates of housing rent and OER is
around 0.85. Hence, the shelter component of CPI and PCE is almost entirely driven by the
housing rental market.
The new channel of monetary policy that we claim to unveil is as follows: when the
monetary authority increases (decreases) interest rates, real housing rents increase (decrease).
This creates a measurement issue in tracking underlying nominal inflation and leads to a
1If we excluded the food and energy components from CPI and PCE, that is, if our reference was not
total CPI or total PCE but core CPI and core PCE, the current weights of shelter in core CPI would be
over 40% and over 17% in the case of core PCE.
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downward (upward) biased estimate of inflation when CPI or PCE are used. Because directly
and indirectly, housing rents have a fairly large weight on CPI and PCE, this bias may
be sufficiently large and lead the monetary policy authority to keep setting interest rates
too high (low) in its attempt to achieve a certain inflation target. This feedback can add
unnecessary variation to the underlying inflation rate and housing prices, and generate large
welfare costs and losses to a monetary policy whose objective is to minimize inflation and
output gap variance.
To formalize and quantify the importance of this mechanism we add an endogenous housing
tenure choice mechanism and heterogeneous agents to a standard New Keynesian model
(Clarida et al., 1999). By including housing rents, we can introduce a theoretical CPI in
the model that is constructed based on a weighted basked of housing rents and composite
consumption good. We calibrate the model to match key features of the U.S. economy
assuming the monetary authority reacts to CPI, and show that it fits remarkably well some
of the data moments that are not targeted by the calibration exercise. Moreover, with our
model, we are able to endogenously generate a price puzzle without having to assume that
there is a cost channel of monetary policy. 2
With the calibrated model we do a counterfactual exercise where we compare both aggre-
gates and price dynamics of the calibrated model, the benchmark case, whereby we assume
the interest rate Taylor rule takes CPI as input, to an alternative setting where the Taylor
rule takes a rents-free consumer price index as input. Our counterfactual exercises reveal
that: 1) targeting a measure of inflation that excludes housing rents leads to a 0.9% welfare
gain in consumption equivalent variation and to a 14.5% fall in the loss function of monetary
policy whose objective is to minimize inflation and output gap variance; 2) we estimate that
this mechanism can explain 37.5% of the increase in house prices above trend3 that occurred
between 2002 and 2007; 3) under the alternative scenario, we find that the standard devia-
2In a companion paper, Chapter 1 of this monograph, we explore this result further, and show that to a
large extent the price puzzle can be explained by the response of shelter to monetary shocks. In addition,
we also show that inflation is much less persistent than what analyses based on overall CPI or PCE suggest.
3The trend was computed using an HP filter. It is worth noting our model is a business cycle model and
has nothing to say with respect to housing prices trend. Although the trend of housing prices was substantial
between 2002 and 2006, we can still analyse by how much housing prices were above trend for the same
period and compare this housing prices business cycle dynamics for the two different scenarios.
3
tion of housing prices and nominal inflation would have been 24.8% and 19.9% lower for the
1984-2006 US experience, respectively.
In this paper, we do not argue for the exclusion of housing rents from the CPI in every
circumstance. Housing rents are an important item on measuring households cost of living
since households spend around 30% of their income with shelter, and hence should be part of
the consumer price index. In general, price indexes trends capture well the evolution of the
nominal state of the economy. However, when relative prices of some specific goods change
suddenly, these price indexes are affected regardless of how underlying monetary inflation
behaves. Vining and Elwertowski (1976) make this point very clearly. This is one of the
reasons economists have built core versions of the price indexes. When studying the effects
of monetary policy on the monetary inflation, it is important to remove housing rents, thus
creating a different core index, because their relative price is strongly affected and they have
a large weight in price indexes. When these two facts are added together, serious biases can
be introduced when tracking the nominal state of the economy.
Our contribution adds to three distinct strands of literature, namely the literature looking
at housing and the business cycle, the literature about problems of the CPI, or similar price
indexes, as a measure of inflation, and literature about housing tenure choice. The two papers
about housing and the business cycle that are closest to our contribution are Iacoviello (2005)
and Leamer (2007). In Iacoviello (2005), the author makes the point that housing market
generate amplifications of the business cycle dynamics because housing prices are used as
collateral and they co-move with the economy activity. In our paper, we abstract from the
housing prices financial channel and focus on explaining how housing rents can also lead to
business cycle amplifications through mismeasurement in the CPI coupled with a Taylor rule.
In Leamer (2007), the author argues that “housing is the business cycle” and proposes that
the monetary authority should not only target inflation and GDP, but also housing starts.
In this paper we incorporate this suggestion indirectly because by better controlling (true)
inflation, the monetary authority is also indirectly controlling the incentives for investment
in housing.
In the case of the literature on the problems of CPI as measure of inflation, we add to the
literature on measures of core inflation – the issue we highlight is due to a change in relative
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prices – but also to the literature on the biases of the CPI as measure of inflation. In the
case of core inflation, the list of contribution is very long and therefore the best reference is
a survey paper like Clark (2001) which summarizes the main contributions in this area. In
the case of biases of the CPI as measures of inflation, the starting point of this literature is
Boskin et al. (1998). In this paper, the authors estimate that due to different sources, the
CPI is biased upwards by more than 1 percentage point. Moreover, specifically analysing
how shelter is computed in the CPI, Gordon and vanGoethem (2007) argue rental shelter
housing has been biased downward for its entire history since 1914, while Dı´az and Luengo-
Prado (2008) show that the rental equivalence approach overestimates the cost of housing
services. An important distinction of our paper to this literature is that we show a dynamic
bias in the CPI instead of a static one.
To the best of our knowledge, the first model of housing tenure choice was developed by
Henderson and Ioannides (1983). However, their analysis is in a partial equilibrium setting.
More recently, Chambers et al. (2009) have expanded the structure of the rental and housing
markets and were able to show mortgage innovations in the U.S. account for most changes
in homeownership rate. Sommer et al. (2013) take Chambers et al. (2009) structure and are
the first to consider a model where both housing rents and housing prices are determined
in equilibrium. However, Sommer et al. (2013) analysis is for steady state and transitional
dynamics. In our paper, at the cost of extremely simplify the structure on the housing and
rental market, we are able to endogeneize housing rents and housing prices in the business
cycle.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 1.2 we provide our main
empirical findings which show the effect of monetary policy on housing rents and housing
tenure choice. Section 1.3 builds the monetary model and section 1.4 calibrates the model to
the US experience and discusses the model solution. Section 1.5 shows the counter factual
exercise with the calibrated model. Finally, section 1.6 draws the main conclusions of the
paper.
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1.2 Empirical Findings
1.2.1 Evidence on the effect of monetary policy on housing rents and prices
In this section we describe the data used and show the impulse responses of the variables of
interest to a contractionary monetary policy shock using SVAR and FAVAR. The monetary
contractionary shock is defined here as an unexpected increase in the federal funds rate.
Our main finding is that housing rents respond positively to a contractionary monetary
policy shock. This response is surprising as housing prices, most other sale prices and output
respond negatively to the same shock Moreover, the response is large in magnitude. In our
benchmark SVAR, we find that a permanent increase of the federal funds rate by 25 basis
points increases housing rents by 1.22% after five years.
1.2.1.1 SVAR
A. SVAR Data and Identification
The data used in the SVAR covers the 1975-2006 period for the US. The starting period
was selected based on when housing prices data became available. We exclude the period of
the great recession because the standard monetary transmission mechanism was lost during
the period. Hence, interest rate Taylor rule behaviour was no longer a good description
of monetary policy in the neighbouring period of the great recession. For this reason, we
excluded the period from our analysis.
All data was collected from FRED database. We used six aggregate time series for the
US in our SVAR analysis: real gross domestic product (GDPC1), all-transactions house
price index (USSTHPI), rent of primary residence in CPI (CUS-R0000SEHA), GDP deflator
(GDPDEF), M1 money stock (M1) and finally federal funds rate (FF). Real housing prices
and rents were computed deflating the housing price index and rents with the GDP deflator.
All series were transformed to be covariance stationary using log-difference with the exception
of federal funds rate. This transformation also allows for an easier interpretation of the
impulse-response functions.
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The SVAR is an appropriate empirical strategy to analyze the dynamic impact of monetary
policy on housing rents as it allows one to identify a monetary policy shock with a small
set of assumptions. In our benchmark SVAR, we use the standard Cholesky identification
following Christiano et al. (1998) whereby the order follows GDP, Inflation, Housing rents,
housing prices, federal funds rate and M1. Hence, monetary policy instruments are ordered
last and have no contemporaneous effect on the remaining variables of the system.
However, the ordering of the variables in the system is always a cause of concern. In this
particular case, matters become worse because how can one order housing prices and rents?
However, our main results are robust to different orderings in the Cholesky decomposition.
In addition, our results are also robust to a different identification strategy by pure-sign
restriction following Uhlig (2005). In the pure-sign restriction we restrict the response of
inflation to be negative, M1 to also be negative and federal funds rate to be positive for four
periods while the remaining responses are left unrestricted.
B. SVAR Results
Our main finding is housing rents increase after a monetary contractionary policy shock.
In addition, we show housing prices decrease in response to the same shock. While the result
on housing prices confirms previous findings in the literature like in Iacoviello (2005) and
Del Negro and Otrok (2007), the housing rents positive response is novel and surprising.
In Figure 1.1, we show the responses of our six variable benchmark SVAR to a positive
standard deviation shock in the federal funds rate. All the responses are in percentage points
on the level of each variable. Housing rents responds positively after six quarters forward.
The initial sluggish response of housing rents could be the result of stickiness, as housing
rents contracts are usually annual.
The effect of the monetary policy contractionary shock on housing rents is long lasting,
reaching an approximately 0.4% positive response after twenty quarters, five years. The
response is large in magnitude and although not reported here, the response is also significant
at a 95% credible set. If we calculate the accumulated effect on housing rents, we find that
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Figure 1.1: Recursive identification Impulse Responses and confidence bands of the SVAR
system to a standard deviation shock in the federal funds rate. Confidence bands represent
the 68% credible set of point estimate impulse responses.
a permanent increase of the federal funds rate by 25 basis points increases housing rents by
1.22% after five years.
The positive response of housing rents happens while output, price level and housing prices
are decreasing. In particular, we find the usual u-shape response of output to a contractionray
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monetary policy shock and that housing prices respond in a larger magnitude than rents in
the opposite direction. The negative effect we find of monetary policy on housing rents
confirms previous literature findings, like Del Negro and Otrok (2007).
One might worry about the specific order selected in the Cholesky decomposition to iden-
tify the SVAR. Hence, as a robustness check we estimate the SVAR with different orders
and with an agnostic identifications strategy following Uhlig (2005). The results for the
pure-sign restriction are reported in Figure 1.2. In the pure-sign identification we restrict
the response of inflation and M1 be negative and federal funds rate to be positive for four
periods while the remaining responses are left unrestricted.
The impulse-responses to the contractionary monetary policy shock using the pure-sign
restriction are qualitatively the same as what we found in the SVAR with the Cholesky
decomposition. In particular, we also find housing rents increase while housing prices fall.
However, the responses are larger in magnitude in the pure-sign restriction. Here, the
standard deviation shock in the federal funds rate is approximately 0.24%, which is close to
what is reported in Uhlig (2005), while the standard deviation in the benchmark SVAR was
0.86%. After accounting for the standardization of the impulse-response functions (dividing
the responses by the standard deviation) we find that the response of housing rents to a 1%
increase in the federal funds rate is 0.46% and 0.83% in the Cholesky decomposition and
pure-sign restriction, respectively.
1.2.1.2 FAVAR
A. FAVAR Data and Identification
The FAVAR methodology provides a solution to the limited information problem of the
SVAR, and shows that the added information it exploits helps in properly identifying the
monetary transmission mechanism. We use quarterly data on 114 time series, that include
a broad measures of prices, production, housing and business activity4 like in Stevanocic
4We thank Dalibor Stevanovic for kindly providing us with the dataset
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Figure 1.2: Pure-Sign Restriction with k = 4 Impulse Responses and confidence bands of
the SVAR system to a standard deviation shock in federal funds. Confidence bands
represent the 68% credible set of point estimate impulse responses. Here House Prices and
Rents are left unrestricted.
(2015) Stevanovic (2015) plus our variables of interest over the 1959Q1- 2006 Q4. All data
are assumed stationary or transformed to be covariance stationary5.
We follow Bernanke et al. (2005) and first use principal components analysis to construct
three factors that provide information about the underlying state of the economy. Secondly,
5The principal components analysis requires the data is all in a similar scale and is stationary
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we treat the Federal funds rate (FFYF) as an observed factor and estimate a SVAR with
four variables: the federal funds rate plus the three factors we estimated using principal
components.
The FAVAR naturally allows to overcome missing data. We replace the missing values
with the mean of each variable and use principal components to estimate the factors with
the full dataset. There is no clear way on how one should proceed when dealing with missing
data, since not including the full sample period when data is available to most of the variables
can also create bias. In our case, the factors estimation will not be adversely affected by
the missing data since it amounts to only 1.6% of the total data. At the same time, the
benefits of adding more information on all other series are rather large. Hence, we decided to
estimate the full sample. Nonetheless, the results are robust if we use 1983-2006 sub-sample
period only.
Another interesting feature of the FAVAR is that we can recover the impulse-responses
functions of any of the data series we are interested in, through the effect of the shock on
each factor. This is made possible by the principal components analyses that decomposes
all series by how much they are explained by factors and by what is unknown. Hence, using
the loading factor coefficients we can then recover the effect of a contractionary monetary
policy shock in any variable of interest.
B. FAVAR Results
The FAVAR results confirm our SVAR findings while arguably having a better identifi-
cation of the contractionary monetary policy shock. In Figure 1.3, we present the impulse-
response functions of the variables that constituted the benchmark SVAR to allow an easier
comparison between the two results. Housing rents respond positively to an unexpected
increase in the federal funds rate, while all other sale prices, housing prices and output are
falling. Here, the u-shape of output response is clear and this confirms the neutrality of
monetary policy in the long-run.
Housing rents response is initially less sluggish than in the benchmark SVAR but it still
only starts increasing at a higher pace after three to four quarters. Housing prices again
11
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Figure 1.3: FAVAR impulse-responses of variables that constituted the benchmark SVAR
to a standard deviation shock in the federal funds rate.
respond in a faster fashion than housing rents. The magnitude of responses is hard to infer
directly from the scale reported in Figure 1.3 since all variables were standardized in order to
use the FAVAR methodology. Since, we use the FAVAR just as more of a robustness exercise,
we are more interested in the qualitative behaviour of the impulse-response functions.
To put it in a nutshell, our main empirical findings on the effect of monetary policy on
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housing rents are housing rents increase after a contractionary monetary policy shock. This
result is surprising and motivates the question on what market mechanism is behind such
price dynamics.
We suggest the effect of monetary policy on housing tenure choice, that is, the choice
between owning and renting, can rationalize our empirical findings. In the presence of
nominal or financial frictions, when nominal interest rates increases, the real interest rate
increases as well and the real cost of owning relative to renting increases. Given everything
else equal, this may make some people that are close to be indifferent to prefer to rent instead
of buying. If housing supply remains constant or decreases, this change in consumption
behavior leads to an increase of housing rents relative to all other goods in the economy
while all other prices and income fall. We test if the implications at the aggregate level of
such a mechanism are present in the next section.
1.2.2 Evidence on the effect of monetary policy on housing tenure choice
In order to test if the housing tenure choice mechanism is present we show what are the
effects of monetary policy on homeownership rate, homeowner vacancy rate, rental vacancy
rate. Again, we use SVARs and FAVARs to address this question.
In the SVAR, we add these three variables to the benchmark system and re-estimate the
model. By adding all of theses variables, we quickly loose a large number of degrees of
freedom which highlights some of the limitations of SVARs. In addition, how to order these
additional variables is hard to answer. The results are presented in Figure 1.4. The responses
of rental vacancy rate and homeownership rate turn out to be non-significant. Moreover,
although housing rents behave similar to what we find in the benchmark case, the same
cannot be said about housing prices. With the extended SVAR, housing prices are also not
significant. The FAVAR methodology allows one to overcome these limitations.
In Figure 1.5, we present the response-functions on variables that are related to the housing
tenure choice plus some other variables of interest that are commonly reported in other
studies that use FAVARs. All the results confirm the effect of monetary policy on housing
13
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Figure 1.4: Recursive identification Impulse Responses and confidence bands of the
extended SVAR system to a standard deviation shock in the federal funds rate. Confidence
bands represent the 68% credible set of point estimate impulse responses.
tenure choice. Although, confidence intervals are not reported here yet, a preliminary one
step bootstrap confirmed that all of the responses are significant at a 68% confidence level.
We find homeownership rate decreases, which confirms at the aggregate level that more
households decide to rent instead of own a house after an unexpected increase in interest
rates. Moreover, we also finds the rental vacancy rate decreases, suggesting that there
is a demand pressure on housing rents and that supply does not seem to keep up making
vacancies decrease over total supply of housing rental. At the same time, the opposite is true
to homeowner vacancy rate. Finally, similar to previous literature Bernanke et al. (2005), we
also find that housing starts decrease, suggesting that housing prices are not falling because
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Figure 1.5: FAVAR impulse-responses of housing variables, unemployment rate and
capacity utilization rate to a standard deviation shock in the federal funds rate.
of an increase in supply but rather from a strong decrease in housing demand.
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1.3 New Keynesian Model with Housing Tenure Choice
We extend Clarida et al. (1999) model with endogenous tenure choice decision, housing prices
and housing rents. The inclusion of housing tenure choice in a standard New Keynesian
model with Taylor rule allow us to derive implications of monetary policy shocks to both
housing prices and rents as well as on homeownership rate. Moreover, by including housing
rents, we can introduce a theoretical CPI in the model that is constructed on housing rents
and composite consumption good. By assuming that a central bank reacts to an imperfect
measure of inflation like CPI, we show how different feedback between inflation and monetary
policy is created in a Taylor rule that responds to CPI instead of inflation. In our model,
housing rents increase when interest rates increase. Hence, central banks over reacts to
inflation shocks when they observe an imperfect measure of inflation like a consumer price
index. This effect is worse the larger the share of housing rents in the consumer price index.
Consider an economy where there is a continuum of households with measure one that
live infinitely and that from time to time make a discrete decision on weather to own or rent
a house when they go to the housing market. There is a fixed probability of re-optimizing
on whether to rent or own a house. This probability is assumed to be the same across all
agents, both renters and home owners. Therefore, a constant mass of households are going to
re-optimize every period. Given, that the mass of households has measure one, the amount
of households that re-optimize is just the probability of re-optimizing. This idea is close in
spirit to Calvo (1983), whereby a fixed share of firms are allowed to re-optimize every period.
Households are heterogeneous with respect to their preference on the housing services
coming from owning a house. Some agents prefer more than others to live in a house they
own instead of a rented one. This assumption is commonly assumed in the tenure choice
literature. We assume that every period each agent has an iid draw from the uniform
distribution. The heterogeneity is needed in order to generate households that rent and
households that own their house. There are alternative ways to introduce heterogeneity in
this model that give the same qualitative implications on the dynamics of the model. Two
examples are different households expectations about future housing prices and heterogeneity
in maintenance costs when owning a house. These alternatives complicate the solution
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without affecting the results.
We assume that in the initial period of the world only a share of the households are
endowed with housing stock. Moreover, the households that receive housing stock will have
initial high debt so that the initial income is the same across all households. In other
words, in the initial period, some households have housing stock to sell but high debt, and
others have no initial housing stock and no debt. Moreover, besides the deciding whether
to own or rent a house, agents can fully insure against aggregate shocks. This assumption
helps isolating the effects coming from heterogeneity in the housing market and it makes
the model trackable. The interaction of income distribution and housing distribution would
make the model more complicated to solve as we need to keep track of both distributions
over time.
The set of assumptions made in this paper reduces the dimensionality problem while
allowing us to capture the main dynamics of household heterogeneity in the housing market
and how this heterogeneity affects the price dynamics in the housing market. Given income is
the same and that decisions, besides the discrete choice, are not affected by the heterogeneity
in households preferences, we can go from infinite types ex-ante to only two types ex-post.
A household type that rents and other that owns the housing stock. However, the quantity
of each type is still endogenous and that is the main difference to standard models in the
literature.
Following Iacoviello (2005) we assume there is a fixed stock of housing in this economy.
Moreover we assume the shares of the the total stock that is devoted to rent and owning are
also fixed. By doing so, we abstract from the supply side when we analyse the price dynamics.
There are two main reason that makes one more comfortable with such assumption. First,
empirical evidence on the supply side of housing shows the supply of housing decreases when
interest rates increase, which would make the impact of interest rate on housing prices and
rents stronger. The second reason is we are mainly interested in the dynamics of repeated
sales of housing stock. Our main interest lies on studying how the price of the same housing
stock fluctuates over the business cycle.
The stock of houses for owning is owned by the households that bought that housing
stock. In this economy, there exists landlords that own the housing stock for rent and rent
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it to the households. Landlords take care of maintenance costs and include them in housing
rents that are charged to any agent type. Hence, households do not face any maintenance
cost when renting a house. We assume all agents have fixed equal shares of the landlords
firms and thus receive the same amount of profits coming from renting housing.
In our environment, households go on their respective housing market every period. That
is, if you are a renter you go to the housing rental market and decide on how much to rent
every period. And if you are a owner, you sell the stock you had from previous period
and decide on how much to buy again. However, sometimes the households are going to
re-optimize and decide on whether he wants to rent or own a house. There are many reasons
why come household would do so, but we abstract from this exercise. Here, we just assume
households do not re-optimize every period.
The production side of the economy is similar to Clarida et al. (1999). There is a continuum
of intermediate monopolistic firms who produce using labor only and sell their product to
be used as an input by the final good firms, and are subject to sticky prices. Final good
firms produce using intermediate goods varieties only. The monopolistic intermediate firms
on the consumption sector are the source of nominal rigidity while housing prices and rents
are assumed to be flexible. Finally, there is a monetary authority that obeys a Taylor rule
when setting interest rates.
A. Households
Households decide on how much to consume of the composite consumption good and
housing services, and finally on how much to borrow with nominal bonds. Households
supply labor ineslastically and receive a nominal wage Wt for their total labor. On the
one hand. if the household decides to own a house, he pays Qt for each unit of housing
services6. On the other hand, if the household decides to rent a house, he pays Rt. Finally,
households receive/pay gross nominal interest It on their nominal bonds. The households
have to choose between renting and owning a house. Once they decide to rent or own
6We assume for simplicity that each unit of housing stock provides exactly one unit of housing services.
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they are stuck with that decision until they can re-optimize again. Therefore, to make this
choice, they compare how much utility they receive from each alternative, and choose the
one that yields the highest discounted utility to them. The utility is both discounted by time
preference of consumption and the probability of re- optimizing. Let V denote the indirect
utility function, the agent will choose to rent or own depending on which choice gives him
the highest level of utility.
max
rent,own
(V ∗rent, V
∗
own)
When households decide to rent, note that there is no heterogeneity and hence their
decision is the same among the households who decide to rent. Their problem7 can be
described as:
max
cˆt,hˆt,bˆt+1,Nt
E0
∞∑
t=0
(β)t(ln cˆt + α ln hˆt − exp(τt)N
1+η
t
1 + η
)
s.t.
cˆt + Lthˆt + bˆt = at
at = WtNt + Πt +O(ownedt−1)(
It
pit
bt−1 +Qtht−1)
given h0, b0
(1.1)
Where τ is an exogenous preference shock to leisure and at stands for the household net
worth. The indicator function O takes the value one if he households owned a house in the
previous period. If he did, he is going to have a debt associated with that purchase that
offsets the value of the house. Hence, we assume that the net worth of the agents who are
considering renting is the same regardless of whether the household owned a house or not
in the previous period. Also, when renting, households do not own the housing stock and
7Under the iid heterogeneity assumption, one can show that the optimization problem of the household
does no depend on considerations about the possibility of changing the tenure choice decision in the future.
For the technical details, see section II in appendix A. We thank Dan Bernhardt for pointing out that the
solution for a perfectly correlated heterogeneity takes a different form.
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hence cannot sell the housing stock in the next period. In our model, we implicitly assume
that landlords take care of any type of maintenance.
Solving for the first order conditions of this maximization problem we get the following
Euler equations:
cˆ−1t = βEt[
It+1
pit+1
cˆ−1t+1] (1.2)
α
hˆt
=
Lt
cˆt
(1.3)
exp(τt)N
η
t cˆt = Wt (1.4)
Equation (2), the first Euler equation represents the typical dynamic trade-off between
consumption now and future consumption. This trade-off is a direct result from the savings
decision. The second Euler equation (3) represents the new feature of our model, and it shows
the trade-off between consumption of the composite final good and housing services. Finally,
the third Euler equation (4) represents the trade-off between leisure and consumption.
When the households decide to own a house, their problem is to:
max
ct,ht,bt,Nt
E0
∞∑
t=0
(β)t(ln ct + α lnht − exp(τt)N
1+η
t
1 + η
− ρi)
s.t.
ct +Qtht + bt = at
at = WtNt + Πt + I(ownedt−1)(
It
pit
bt−1 +Qtht−1)
given h0, b0
(1.5)
Solving for the first order conditions of this maximization problem we get the following
Euler equations:
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cˆ−1t = βEt[
It+1
pit+1
c−1t+1] (1.6)
α
ht
=
1
ct
(
Qt − Qt+1
It+1/pit+1
)
(1.7)
exp(τt)N
η
t ct = Wt (1.8)
Given the optimal decisions coming from both tenure choices, households will choose the
one that gives him more utility. Moreover, assuming the net worth is the same and given
our log utility function, the only difference between the tenure decisions is going to be the
amount of housing services and consumption. Hence we have households will rent if:
V ∗rent = E0
∞∑
t=0
(β)t(ln cˆ∗t + α ln hˆ
∗
t ) > E0
∞∑
t=0
(β)t(ln c∗t + α lnh
∗
t − ρi) = V ∗own
Hence, using (3) and (6) and simplifying we have that the indifferent household is given
by the following equality:
E0
∞∑
t=0
(β)tLthˆ
1+α
t = E0
∞∑
t=0
(β)t
((
Qt − Qt+1
It+1/pit+1
)
h1+αt − ρ¯t
)
(1.9)
ρ¯t = (1− β)E0
∞∑
t=0
(β)t
((
Qt − Qt+1
It+1/pit+1
)
h1+αt − Lthˆ1+αt
)
(1.10)
The household that is indifferent between renting and owning pins down how many house-
holds are going to rent and own a house in equilibrium. Households that prefer to own a
house at a level ρi < ρ¯, will decide to own a house while households they have ρi > ρ¯ will
rent. Note that the cutoff rule ρ¯ is endogenous and depends on prices and allocations.
B. Firms
The firm problem in our model is standard in the New Keynesian framework. We use a
continuum of intermediate monopolistic firms together with Calvo pricing mechanism that
use only labor input in production.
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Each household buys their consumption good from final good firms. The final good firms
buy Yit from the intermediate sector for Pit and sell their production to the households for
Pt. The technology of production of the final good firms is given by:
Yt =
(∫ 1
0
Yit
1− 1
 dk
) 
−1
,  > 1 (1.11)
Individual demand for each intermediate firms product is given by:
Yit =
(
Pit
Pt
)−
Yt (1.12)
Equations (11) and (12) imply that:
Intermediate firms demand labor and their production technology is given by:
Yit = AtNt(k) (1.13)
In our model nominal rigidity is imposed like in Calvo (1983) whereby a fraction of firms,
1− θ, is allowed to reset price each period. The problem is symmetric and so all firms that
can re-optimize choose P ∗t to solve:
max
P ∗t
E0
∞∑
τ=0
θτ
{
νt+τ (P
∗
t Yi,t+τ − Φt+τ |Yt+τ |t
}
(1.14)
Where Φt+τ is the marginal cost at a specific level of production. The profits of the
intermediate firms are transfers to the households. The details of the derivations of P ∗ in a
nonlinear fashion can be found in Church (2014).
As a fraction of prices stays unchanged, the aggregate price level evolution is;
Pt = (θP
1−
t−1 + (1− θ)P ∗t 1−)1/(1−) (1.15)
If we do a first order approximation around the steady state on Equation (15) together
with the solution to (14), we get the forward-looking Phillips curve. In our case, we will
do a second order approximation because agents use welfare when deciding to own or rent.
Hence, we a second order approximation around steady state in order to have an accurate
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solution of the model.
C. Consumer Price Index
With the explicit introduction of housing rents, we can formalize the implied consumer
price index in our model economy. The consumer price index in going to be a weighted
average of nominal prices of housing and non-housing goods. We assume the weight a of 0.3
on housing shelter that is the same as in the data CPI. Hence we have CPI inflation is given
by:
CPIt = a
Pt
Pt−1
+ (1− a) Pt
Pt−1
Lt
Lt−1
(1.16)
The consumption good real price is 1 and hence the price variation is given by monetary
inflation. However, housing rents nominal change of prices is a composition of monetary
inflation and real housing rents inflation. From equation (16) it is clear that CPI gives a
guidance on how monetary inflation behaves in trend if real prices behave like some white
noise. However, if real prices change strongly and persistently in opposite directions, CPI
becomes noisy as a measure of monetary inflation. This model provides a formal way to
start thinking about how monetary inflation should be measured, and goes in the direction
of providing insights to the points raised in Vining and Elwertowski (1976).
D. Central Bank
The central bank implements a Taylor-type of interest rate rule. Hence, central bank
reacts to output gap and inflation gap according to:
It = (It−1)φI (CPI
1+φpi
t−1 (Yt−1/Y )
φY r)1−φIeI,t (1.17)
We assume all agents in the economy measure well monetary inflation and know the central
bank targets the implied CPI with housing rents. In the counterfactual section we show how
this economy differs from one where the central bank reacts to a CPI that is rents-free.
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E. Exougenous Shocks
In our model economy τt has follows an AR(1) process:
τt = ρττt−1 + eτ,t (1.18)
Hence, there are two kinds of shocks: a preference on leisure shock eτ,t and a monetary
policy shock eI,t. Both shocks follow a normal distribution eτ,t ∼ N(0, στ ) and eI,t ∼
N(0, σI), respectively.
F. Market Clearing
The market clearing conditions in our economy are the following:
Goods Market
γ
∫ ρ¯t−1
0
ctdi+ (1− γ)
∫ ρ¯t
0
ctdi+ γ
∫ 1
ρ¯t−1
cˆtdi+ (1− γ)
∫ 1
ρ¯t
cˆtdi = Wt + Πt ∀t (1.19)
Labor Market
∫ 1
0
Njtdj = Nt ∀t (1.20)
Homeowners housing market
γ
∫ ρ¯t−1
0
htdi+ (1− γ)
∫ ρ¯t
0
htdi = H
O ∀t (1.21)
Rental housing market
γ
∫ 1
ρ¯t−1
hˆtdi+ (1− γ)
∫ 1
ρ¯t
hˆtdi = H
R ∀t (1.22)
Nominal Bonds Market
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γ∫ ρ¯t−1
0
btdi+ (1− γ)
∫ ρ¯t
0
btdi+ γ
∫ 1
ρ¯t−1
bˆtdi+ (1− γ)
∫ 1
ρ¯t
bˆtdi = 0 ∀t (1.23)
G. Equilibrium
Definition. The Rational Expectations Competitive Equilibrium is a sequence household
choices {ct, cˆt, ht, hˆt,
bt+1, bˆt+1, Nt}∞t=0, a sequence of housing tenure choice (rent vs own) {oi}∞t=0, profits and
transfers {Πt}∞t=0 ,a cut-off preference level that makes the households indifferent between
renting and owning {ρ¯t}∞t=0 and a sequence of prices {Wt, Qt, Lt, Pt, P ∗t CPIt, It}∞t=0 such
that:
1) Given prices and profits, {ct, ht, bt+1, Nt}∞t=0 solves the households problem when owning
and {cˆt, hˆt, bˆt+1, Nt}∞t=0 solves the households problem when renting.
2) Given prices and allocations, {ρ¯t}∞t=0 solves equation (10).
3) Given prices and allocations, {P ∗t }∞t=0 solves (10) and profits {Πt}∞t=0 are the associated
indirect function (14) with optimal price {P ∗t }∞t=0.
4) Given allocations, {Wt, Qt, Lt}∞t=0 solve market clearing (19), (20), (21), (22) and (23).
5) Given prices and allocations, {Pt}∞t=0 solves equation (15), {CPIt}∞t=0 solves equation
(16) and{It}∞t=0 solves equation (17).
1.4 Calibration and Solution
We calibrate the model to match long-term moments of the US economy. All parameter
values are taken form previous literature on New Keynesian models like Iacoviello (2005),
Clarida et al. (1999) and Christiano et al. (2005). In Table 1 we show the parameters values.
The inter-temporal discount factor was selected to match the US steady state annual interest
rate approximately.
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Description Parameter Value
Preferences
Discount Factor β 0.99
Weight on housing services α 0.10
Labor Supply Aversion η 0.01
Tenure Choice
Friction 1− γ 0.0375
Sticky Prices
Steady State Markup X 1.20
Probability of fixed price θ 0.75
CPI
Housing Rents Share in CPI a 0.30
Taylor Rule
Interest Rate Smoothing φI 0.80
Reaction to Inflation Gap φpi 1.50
Reaction to Output Gap φY 0.10
Exogenous Shocks
Persistence of Leisure Preference Shock ρτ 0.90
Leisure Preference Shock Std. Dev. στ 0.010
Interest Rate Shock Std. Dev. σI 0.007
Table 1.1: Benchmark model calibrated parameters. The γ parameter is calibrated to
match that 15% of households move in given year (Bachmann and Cooper (2014)). All
other parameters are selected from previous literature on standard New Keynesian models
like Clarida et al. (1999), Christiano et al. (2005), and Iacoviello (2005).
The parameter that governs the labor supply aversion with a value of 0.01 implies a
practically flat labor supply. This is higher than what microeconometric studies suggest, but
it is consistent with the weak observed response of real wages to macroeconomic disturbances
and moreover can be motivated by the changes in labor supply coming from the extensive
margin. That is the amount of individuals that change from unemployed to employed, even
though hours works do not change much for individuals at work.
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The preference parameter on housing services is justified by Iacoviello (2005). Our pref-
erences are the same the exception that we do not model explicitly money. However, money
has a insignificant impact on utility function in Iacoviello (2005), which is typically the
case in money in the utility models. The markup is taken from Christiano et al. (2005).
The housing rents share in CPI is around 30%. The Taylor rule parameters are taken from
Clarida et al. (1999) and are similar to those used by Iacoviello (2005). These parameters
imply a Taylor rule that describes well monetary policy post Volcker period. Finally, the
shock on monetary policy was calibrated to match the initial response of interest rates of
the benchmark SVAR.
The model is solved using a perturbation method with a second order approximation
around the steady state. The second order approximation in our model is crucial because
agents compare lifetime utility function when deciding on whether to own or rent a house.
It is well known that first order approximations give inaccurate solutions to welfare analysis
because they miss second moments. Hence, with the second order approximation and small
shocks we are able to accurately solve the model.
Although our model is highly stylised, Table 2 shows the model performs remarkably
well in matching long term moments like ownership rate and price to rent ratio, as well
as business cycle moments. Although the source of heterogeneity in our model comes only
from preferences, and that the housing supply side is introduced in a very simple way, the
homeownership rate we get from our model is close to the data. Our preferences heterogeneity
is, in some sense, a reduce form approach to what drives the homeownership rate. For the
fundamentals behind the homeownership rate and the price to rent ratio see Chambers et al.
(2009), Sommer et al. (2013) and Miao et al. (2014). Moreover, the price to rent ratio is also
similar to the average price to rent ratio found in the data, which suggest supply dynamics
do not seem to be important in matching long term housing tenure choices dynamics.
Besides housing prices standard deviation , the model business cycles standard deviation
matches well the data. The model predicts housing prices that almost doubles that of the
data. One reason can be the missing housing market fundamentals in the model and another
reason might be the lack of stickiness in housing rents. Housing rents are very sticky in reality
and in our model they are assume flexible. Given how our mechanism for homeownership
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Moments Model Data
Steady State
Homeownership rate 0.70 0.64
Price-Rent Ratio 23.29 18.80
Business Cycle
CPI Std. Dev. 0.025 0.015
Output Std. Dev. 0.099 0.014
Housing Prices Std. Dev. 0.103 0.054
Housing Rents Std. Dev. 0.0083 0.0069
Table 1.2: Model versus Data comparison of moments that were not targeted
works, if rents do not respond as strongly specially when decreasing (housing rents stickiness
is not symmetric), housing prices will not change as abruptly and this will dampen housing
prices volatility.
With the model calibrated we show the theoretical impulse-response functions in Figure
1.6. The tenure choice mechanism enables the New Keynesian model to opposite responses of
housing prices and housing rents in response to a monetary monetary contractionary shock.
Housing prices decrease and housing rents increase after nominal interest rates increase.
This result is puzzling if one thinks of housing as an asset only. However, housing is also a
consumption good and utility considerations are hence important in determining prices. If
houses are just assets, one would expect housing prices are nothing but the present value of
all future housing rents. Hence, changes in interest rates would have to change both housing
prices and rents in the same direction. However, housing is not just an asset and households
buy housing stock not just to rent it but also to consume it. Hence, there is a dichotomy
between rents and housing prices.
Moreover, with heterogeneous agents, households have different valuations for the same
housing stock. When interest rate increase, more agents prefer to rent instead of owning
creating a change in housing demand in the extensive margin. We can see in Figure 1.6 that
indeed this is the case looking at how homeownership rate decreases after interest rates rise.
The consideration of housing rents allows us to introduce a theoretical consumer price
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Figure 1.6: Impulse-Response functions for main variables of interest for the benchmark
model where the Taylor rule targets CPI. Each graph shows percentage points response of
one of the model’s variables to a one standard deviation shock in monetary policy.
index. We can see in Figure 1.6 that CPI increases in spite of the fact monetary inflation
decreases. This is the result of rising rents that is sufficiently large to overcome the drop in
monetary inflation. CPI then decreases since housing rents start decreasing. Interestingly,
when CPI is targeted by the Taylor rule, monetary inflation first decreases and then increases
above steady state. Since, the monetary authority overshoots interest rates households cut
consumption sharply. As a response to the drop in demand, firms first cut down employment
and decrease prices to maintain the fixed markup. However, households and firms know
the monetary authority is targeting CPI, and once CPI behaves normally, they know the
interest rates are going to quickly drop making them increase consumption. Firms again
increase employment and prices increase given the higher wages. The employment and
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output responses can be found in the appendix A in Figure A.1.
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Figure 1.7: Impulse-Response functions for main variables of interest for the benchmark
model where the Taylor rule targets CPI versus SVAR with Choleski identification that is
consistent with the model. Each graph shows percentage points response of one of the
model’s variables to a one standard deviation shock in monetary policy.
Looking at Figure 1.7, we can see that the model impulse responses matches well the
SVAR impulse response functions. Housing rents increase while housing prices and output
fall. Moreover, we are able to match the “price puzzle” that commonly appears in the
SVAR literature on monetary policy. Hence, looking at a theoretical measure that allows to
construct a price index similar to a CPI, there is no puzzle in a rising CPI while nominal
inflation is decreasing. This happens because the rise in housing rents out weights the
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decrease in nominal inflation. We explore this insight in Chapter 2 and show that the
price puzzle is largely explained by housing rents. Our results suggest a mechanism that
can generate the price puzzle different from the so called channel cost of monetary policy
(Barth and Ramey (2001)) and Christiano et al. (2005). To test this hypothesis, Rabanal
(2006) estimates a New Keynesian model of the business cycle and tests the conditions under
which a cost channel of monetary policy could generate a positive response of prices to a
contractionary monetary policy shock. This author finds that, demand side effects always
dominate supply side effects in prices and therefore there is no evidence that the cost channel
of monetary policy could explain the price puzzle. Our results provide some insights on the
type of demand shocks that drive the response of prices.
The fit is particularly not good in the first periods. This is mainly due to the identification
assumption of the SVAR. We are faced with a trade-off, we either make an identification
ordering that is consistent with the timing assumptions of the model, or we get a better
identification. This trade-off was also faced by Iacoviello (2005). We decided to follow
Iacoviello (2005) and opted for the former one by sacrificing some identification to make the
SVAR more consistent with the model. Hence, given that in the model all variables respond
contemporaneously to shocks in interest rates, we order the federal funds rate first in the
SVAR. Besides, the initial periods, the economy behaves similarly to the SVAR. Finally, it
is worth noting that rents are flexible in the model while in reality rents are very sticky as
shown by the SVAR response of housing rents. If our model had rents being stick like the
data, our theoretical CPI would be able to be always positive like in the data. For more
details on the price puzzle see Chapter 2.
1.5 Counterfactual - CPI versus CPI net of rents
Here, we ask the question on how the dynamics of the model in the benchmark case compare
to the alternative setting, where the monetary authority targets a rents-free consumer price
index. Note that the rents-free price index is just the usual monetary inflation studied in
most of the standard New Keynesian models.
We show in Figure 1.8 the impulse responses of the two different cases. In the alternative
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case, where the monetary authority targets the rents-free CPI, interest rates will be lower
than in the benchmark as a response to the same shock. This happens because when the
monetary authority targets the consumer price index with housing rents, CPI will be initially
above the target, and hence interest rates will be set too high to bring CPI to the target8.
The increase in CPI is in turn driven by rising housing rents. Although the differences
are small in a response to a single shock, these differences can become rather large when
accumulating different shocks to the economy over time. Moreover, if rents were sticky, CPI
distortions would be much larger in later periods. Real interest rate is similar with the
exception of the first period.
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Figure 1.8: Impulse-Response functions for main variables of interest for the benchmark
model where the Taylor rule targets CPI (blue) versus alternative setting when Taylor rule
targets nominal inflation pi (red). Each graph shows percentage-point response of one of
the model’s variables to a one standard deviation shock in monetary policy.
8We also perform a counterfactual for the PCE, and a composite CPI that takes into account homeown-
ership costs for the homeowner as well as rents. The results can be found in Figure A.3 in the appendix
A.1.
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When interest rate Taylor rules use the CPI as an input, interest rates will be set too high
based on rising rents instead of nominal inflation and will add unnecessary variation to the
underlying inflation rate. This generates large welfare costs and losses to a monetary policy
whose objective is to minimize inflation and output gap variance. Table 3 reports the welfare
analysis. We simulate the model with monetary policy shocks for one thousand periods. We
find that targeting a measure of inflation that excludes housing rents leads to a 0.9% welfare
gain in consumption equivalent variation and to a 14.5% fall in the loss function of monetary
policy in comparison to the case that the monetary authority targets a measure of inflation
that includes housing rents. Households are affected differently. Owners are affect more in
consumption equivalent variation because housing prices are more volatile to interest rate
shocks than housing rents.
Benchmark Model Alternative Model
∆%
(Target CPI) (Target pi)
Welfare
Utility 0.2610 0.2703 +3.56%
Owner 0.4920 0.5010 +1.84%
Renter −0.1462 −0.1379 +5.65%
Consumption Equivalent Variation 1.3563 1.3690 +0.93%
Owner 1.6355 1.6504 +0.91%
Renter 0.8640 0.8712 +0.83%
Monetary Policy Loss Function 0.063 0.054 −14.55%
Table 1.3: Welfare Analysis and Monetary Policy Function. All the numbers reported are
the result of simulating the model for 1000 periods, with the initial value set at the steady
state. The monetary policy function is the quadratic function
∑∞
t=0 β
t(pi2t + λ(yt − ytn))
computed with λ = 0.003.
Finally, using the same counterfactual, we answer how prices dynamics might have been
different for the U.S. experience between 1984 and 2006. With two shocks, we assume that
only housing prices and CPI are observable. Then, using the Kalman filter with the cali-
brated parameters we are able to recover the monetary policy and preference shocks for the
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1984-2006 by matching observed series of housing prices and CPI for the same time period.
Figure 1.9 shows the graphs for housing prices and CPI. We can see that the benchmark
model replicates the dynamics of housing prices quite well. We then simulate the model with
the same shocks and show how the price dynamics would differ if the monetary authority re-
acted to a rents-free consumer price index. First, we find that under the alternative scenario
, the standard deviation of housing prices would have been 24.8% lower for the 1984-2006
US experience. Secondly, we estimate that this mechanism can explain 37.5% of the increase
in house prices above trend from 2002 to 2006.
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Figure 1.9: Housing Prices Business cycle on top and CPI business cycle for data from
1984 to 2006 with simulated data form the benchmark and simulated model. All business
cycles are computed using a HP filter. In the model, by assuming we only observe housing
prices and CPI we extract the implied monetary policy and preference shocks using
Kalman Filter. We use the recovered shocks to simulate the model.
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From the second graph in Figure 1.9 we observe that CPI gives indeed a poor estimate
of monetary inflation. Moreover, this mismeasurement is dynamic and changes over time
depending on how housing rents behave. When the monetary authority increases (decreases)
interest rates, real housing rents increase (decrease). This creates a measurement issue
in tracking underlying nominal inflation and leads to a downward (upward) estimate of
inflation when CPI are used. Because directly and indirectly, housing rents have a fairly
large weight on CPI, this mismeasurement may be sufficiently large and lead the monetary
policy authority to keep setting interest rates too high (low) in its attempt to achieve a
certain inflation target.
It is worth noting that the monetary authority has been targeting PCE instead of CPI.
However, the weight on housing rents is still large, and is particularly high when looking at
core PCE. The hazardous effects of the mismeasurment would be smaller than in the CPI
and hence one can think of the CPI as an upper bound to the implications on monetary
inflation. Next, when we compare the benchmark with the alternative scenario, we find that
the standard deviation of nominal inflation would have been 19.9% lower. In the alternative
case, the CPI seems to track better monetary inflation than in the benchmark case. Finally,
it is interesting to note how nominal inflation looked uncontrolled before the recent financial
crisis. This might be the result of apparently low inflation measures through CPI because
of falling housing rents. When the CPI increases, the benchmark monetary inflation quickly
comes back to target while the alternative monetary inflation falls but not as much. This
might be explained by the low reaction of interest rates to shocks in the alternative model.
We do also see a drop in monetary inflation, but not as big as in the benchmark case. This
smaller drop can be explained by the fact that the shocks are identified observing CPI using
the benchmark case.
1.6 Conclusion
In this paper we unveil a new channel through which housing reveals its importance in the
economy by investigating the interaction between monetary policy and housing rents. Using
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SVARs and FAVARs, we first show housing rents respond positively to a contractionary
monetary policy shock. Secondly, recognizing housing rents directly and indirectly account
for about 30% of CPI, we show our first finding brings new insights on inflation measurement
and strong implications to the way monetary policy is conducted. We propose and calibrate
a DSGE model that endogeneizes housing tenure choice and is both able to explain the
empirical findings and provide answers for monetary policy experiments.
Counterfactual exercises reveal that when the Taylor rule uses the CPI as an input, interest
rates will be set too high based on rising rents instead of currency inflation. This generates
large welfare costs, adds unnecessary variation to the underlying monetary inflation rate
and losses to a monetary policy whose objective is to minimize inflation and output gap
variance. Finally, by simulating the model we find monetary policy based on CPI explains a
large proportion of the housing price business cycle boom that preceded the 2008 financial
crisis.
We do not make the case for the exclusion of housing rents from the consumer price indexes
in every circumstance. Housing rents are an important item on measuring households cost
of living since households spend around 30% of their income with shelter, and hence should
be included. In general, price indexes trends capture well the evolution of the nominal
state of the economy. However, when relative prices of some specific goods change suddenly,
the consumer prices indexes are affected regardless of how underlying monetary inflation
behaves. Given that we show housing rents relative price is strongly affected by monetary
policy and that housing rents have a large weight in the consumer price indexes, care should
be in place when interpreting the response of consumer price indexes to monetary policy
shocks as purely monetary inflation.
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CHAPTER 2
THE EFFECT OF MONETARY POLICY ON
HOUSING TENURE CHOICE AS AN
EXPLANATION FOR THE PRICE PUZZLE
2.1 Introduction
Using structural vector autoregression (SVAR) analysis, Sims (1992) noted that inflation
responded positively and persistently to a contractionary monetary policy shock. This re-
sult is puzzling because a central tenet of monetary policy is the ability to control prices by
contracting or expanding monetary supply (vis-a-vis increasing or decreasing interest rates)
when prices are above or below the desired level, respectively. Since this result was first
found, and starting with the paper where it was first shown (Sims (1992), several expla-
nations have been proposed. In this paper, we contribute to this literature by proposing
an alternative explanation of the price puzzle based on the effects of monetary policy on
housing tenure choice and the weight of shelter in the overall consumer price index (CPI).
In Chapter 1 we show that, in response to an expansionary monetary policy shock, house
rents decrease while house prices increase. We use the effects of monetary policy on housing
tenure choice decisions together with heterogeneous valuation of homeownership by agents
to explain this result. When interest rates change, the marginal home buyer may change,
which may make house and rent prices change. Because with a higher interest rate the cost
of homeownership may increase, more people may prefer to rent instead of buying. This shift
in consumption behavior makes house prices decrease and rents increase. This mechanism,
together with the fact that shelter, directly and indirectly, accounts for about 30% of the
overall CPI, can help explain the price puzzle. When interest rates increase (a contractionary
monetary policy shock), the nominal price level decreases, but rents will increase if the share
Joint work with Daniel A. Dias.
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of buyers declines and the share of renters increases. If the increase of rents is sufficiently
larger than the decrease of the nominal price level, then it can be expected that, after a
contractionary monetary policy shock, inflation, measured by CPI, will increase. We test
this idea using structural vector autoregression analysis, similar Sims (1992). Our empirical
results strongly support our idea, and when we take into account the effect of monetary policy
on rents and the weight of shelter in CPI, we find that after a contractionary monetary policy
shock, the price puzzle is substantially reduced or even disappears. Our results are robust
to alternative shocks identification strategies, measures of the price level, sample periods,
and identification strategies. Exogenous changes in the construction of CPI allowed us to
test our theory further. In addition, using different measures of inflation, like the personal
consumption expenditure (PCE) and the deflator of gross domestic product (GDP), in which
the weight of shelter/housing is lower than in the CPI, permitted us to conduct additional
robustness check exercises.
As already mentioned, Sims (1992) proposes the first solution to the price puzzle. The
author argues that the puzzle is due to model misspecification and that, when a commodity
price index variable is included in the SVAR model, most of the puzzle disappears. Hanson
(2004) shows that this solution is sensitive to the sample period. In particular, the inclusion
of commodity prices solves the puzzle for sample periods before 1980 but not for posterior
sample periods. In line with the explanation of Sims (1992), several other papers justify the
puzzle with model misspecification. Giordani (2004) argues that the price puzzle is mostly a
spurious result due to not including a measure of the output gap in the empirical model. Once
this variable is included in the SVAR model, the effect of a contractionary monetary policy
shock on prices is still positive in the first periods but then becomes negative. Bernanke et al.
(2005) also argue that the SVAR model used by Sims (1992) was misspecified and suggest
the utilization of a factor augmented vector autoregressive (FAVAR) model to correct for
the misspecification. Using the suggested model, the authors obtain a response of inflation
to a contractionary monetary policy shock that is closer to the expected response. Brissimis
and Magginas (2006) also argue that the model used by Sims (1992) is misspecified and the
source of misspecification is the lack of forward-looking variables to account for expectations
at the time of the change of interest rates. To fix this problem, the authors added the fed
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funds futures rates and a composite leading indicator of economic activity to the empirical
model. With the new specification, these authors obtain a response of inflation to monetary
shocks that is much more in line with what would be expected.
An alternative line of research that also aims to explain the price puzzle tries to produce
theoretical models in which prices increase after a contractionary monetary policy shock. One
theory that could deliver such a result is the so-called channel cost of monetary policy (Barth
and Ramey (2001)). To test this hypothesis, Rabanal (2006) estimates a New Keynesian
model of the business cycle and tests the conditions under which a cost channel of monetary
policy could generate a positive response of prices to a contractionary monetary policy
shock. This author finds that demand side effects always dominate supply-side effects in
prices and, therefore, there is no evidence that the cost channel of monetary policy can
explain the price puzzle. Our results provide some insights on the type of demand shocks
that drive the response of prices. In contrast to Rabanal (2006), Henzel et al. (2009) estimate
a New Keynesian DSGE model for the euro area and argue that, under certain parameter
restrictions, which are not rejected by the data, the channel cost of monetary policy can
explain the price puzzle.
Our contribution combines both types of explanations and adds to them. We also find
that the SVAR model in Sims (1992) is misspecified, and suggest a way to improve the
specification of the model. In addition, we provide a theoretical explanation (the effect
of monetary policy on housing tenure choice) for why (some) prices may increase after a
contractionary monetary policy shock.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in section 2.2 we discuss some practical
issues regarding the calculation of the CPI; in section 2.3 we present a simple conceptual
framework to guide our empirical implementation; in section 2.4 we describe our data and
data sources; in section 2.5 we present our main empirical results; in section 2.6 we perform
several robustness checks; in section 2.7 we compare our explanation of the price puzzle to
other explanations; and in section 8 we conclude.
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2.2 Housing in the CPI
In this section we present some information regarding the construction of the CPI and discuss
how some of the methodologies used in the construction of the CPI can help in understanding
the price puzzle. The first aspect about the CPI that we note is that total housing expenses
have a 46% weight in the index. This component has two sub-components, shelter and other
housing related expenses, with the former currently weighing 31% in total CPI and the latter
15%.1 This information suggests that the overall CPI may be very sensitive to what happens
in the housing component given how large its weight is.
A second aspect to note is that, although the price of most of the sub-components of
housing (e.g., utilities or insurance) are relatively easy to measure, the price of shelter is
not. The price of shelter is easy to measure when someone lives in a house that does not
belong to her, but very hard to measure in the case of someone living in a house that belongs
to her. When someone lives in her own house, there is no established price for the rent that
this person would have to pay if she was renting that same house. Over time, there have
been different methods to address this problem, and these different methods can attenuate
or exacerbate the price puzzle.
Before February 1983, the CPI calculated shelter costs differently than what is done today.2
The cost of housing shelter for homeowners was based on housing prices, mortgage interest
rates, property taxes, insurance, and maintenance costs. Hence, it included the asset as well
as the service characteristics of housing when estimating the costs of shelter for homeowners.
Some problems with the methodology and with the technical measurement itself were pointed
out by the Bureau of Labor and Statistics (BLS) and the research community. The main
concerns raised were the following: the difficulty faced by the BLS in correctly estimating
the mortgage interest rate cost because of the new financial contracts involving variable
interest rates and specific special arrangements; the difficulty in estimating housing prices
1In this paper, shelter costs only corresponds to rents and the owners’ equivalent rent. The shelter sub-
component of CPI also includes other items which are not relevant to the discussion of the paper. These
other items only weigh 1.1% in total CPI. Hence, total shelter is around 31% and rent plus owners’ equivalent
rent is almost 30%.
2For a more detailed discussion about the changes in the CPI methodology, please see Gillingham and
Lane (1982) and the BLS document on CPI methodology, “How the CPI measures price change of Owner’s
equivalent rent of primary residence (OER) and Rent of primary residence (Rent). ”
40
given the small sample and the low frequency with which houses are traded; the general
concern of the BLS that CPI should have a strong credibility and the possibility that the
way housing shelter was being estimated together with its importance in the CPI could be
negatively affecting the credibility of the index; and lastly, the idea that CPI should be as
close as possible as a good measure of consumption expenditure and, hence, homeownership
costs should be computed as closely as possible to a consumption good and not to an asset.
Given the dissatisfaction with how the cost of shelter for homeowners was computed and
the necessity for a more purely consumption-oriented index, the BLS suggested an alternative
measure called owner’s equivalent rent (OER) of primary residence. The idea behind this
new measure was to ask how much rent would the homeowner have to pay if she had to
rent her own house. In order to answer this question, the BLS defined small geographic
areas, called segments, within each of the 87 CPI pricing areas. A segment corresponds
to one or more Census blocks. For each segment, the BLS collects prices from the rental
market of houses that are representative of that segment. This approach allows the BLS
to get an implicit rent for owners by comparing houses that have similar characteristics as
the representative ones in the rental market in the same segment. In other words, the BLS
uses hedonic pricing methods to estimate the OER. Hence, the OER is very closely related
to the rental prices observed – the correlation between the level of rental prices and OER
is 0.996 while the correlation between the year-on-year growth rates is 0.842. Therefore,
the OER can essentially be seen as a measure of shelter costs faced by homeowners that is
based almost solely on the price of rents from the rental market. The CPI based on this
new measure was first introduced in February 1983, and during a period of six months, until
July 1983, the CPI was calculated using the two measures of shelter costs. This change in
methodology allows us to compare the size of the price puzzle when two alternative measures
of shelter costs are used in the construction of the CPI. In our baseline empirical estimation
we consider a sample starting in January 1983 and ending in December 2006.3
Finally, we present how the relative importance of housing total rent (rent of primary
3We truncate the sample at the end of 2006 to avoid the financial crisis period because during this
period, there were several shocks affecting the usual monetary transmission mechanism, which could affect
our analysis for reasons beyond the scope of this paper.
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Figure 2.1: Weight of rent, owners’ equivalent rent, and total shelter costs in CPI between
1982 and 2012.
Source: BLS.
residency plus the owners’ equivalent rent) evolved between 1982 and 2006. Figure 2.1
shows the evolution of selected items’ weights in CPI. It is clear that almost all of the
increase in the relative importance in CPI of housing rents is driven by the OER. The initial
increase in the OER share in the CPI from 13.5% to 19% was driven by a re-weight in
1981-82. The initial weight of 13.5% was based on 1971-72 expenditure information. This
lag in the re-weighting process of the CPI created a data blip in the OER. After 2000, when
the weight started being estimated every two years, this lag problem was reduced. However,
for the OER, the revision took place in 1982 and, at the time, the weights were still given
by the 1971-72 period, which explains the large increase of the shelter weight in the first
years of the OER implementation. The increase of the share of the OER did not restrict
itself to the beginning of the 1980s. After that, the OER share increased from 19% to 24%
in 2012. The change in 2012 was mostly due to an increase in the quantity demanded of
OER.4 At the same time, the share of rents did not change much. There were some small
4For details, see Church (2014).
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variations, but overall the share of rents remained fairly stable. One possible explanation is
that the housing sizes for rental units did not increase as much as the size of the houses that
are owned by its occupants. Also, there was a large increase of homeownership, especially
during the 2000-2006 period. This fact seems relevant in explaining the slight decrease of
the weight of rent and the increase of the weight of OER in the overall CPI in this period.
Before proceeding to the discussion of the conceptual framework, an important remark is
in place. Although all the previous discussion was only about the construction of the CPI,
similar problems are faced by other alternative measures of inflation such as the the PCE
and the deflator of GDP. The problem of estimating the price of shelter is also present in
these two indexes, but it is less important for explaining the price puzzle because the weight
of shelter is significantly lower than in the CPI (15% in the PCE and 13% in the deflator of
GDP).
2.3 The effect of interest rates on the nominal state of the
economy and the CPI
It is well known that the CPI as a measure of monetary inflation has several problems
for the conduct of monetary policy. One of these problems is that the CPI is not able to
separate price changes caused by changes in the nominal state of the economy from price
changes caused by supply and/or demand shocks (relative price changes). The usual way
to solve this problem is to construct measures of core inflation. These can be as simple as
removing the more volatile components of CPI like energy and unprocessed food, or they
can be more elaborate and come out of econometric models (see Clark (2001) for a survey
of core inflation measures). The measurement issue that we point out in this paper adds
to the list of problems with using CPI (or other measures like the PCE or the deflator of
GDP) as a measure of monetary inflation, but it has important differences from the other
problems previously identified because, according to our idea, the relative price change is
due to changes in interest rates vis-a-vis monetary policy. In order to make our point clearer,
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we write the CPI as the product of two components.
CPI(t) = P (t)(αC(t) + (1− α)R(t)) (2.1)
The first component in equation 2.1 corresponds to the nominal state of the economy at
time t – P(t) – while the second component corresponds to the real prices of non shelter
and shelter consumption – (αC(t) + (1 − α)R(t)). In this example we only consider two
goods/services, consumption net of shelter – C(t) – and shelter – R(t) – because we want
to focus our discussion on the different behavior of the two groups of goods/services in
response to a monetary shock. In the same equation, α represents the weight of non-shelter
consumption in total consumption.
In Chapter 1 we argue that monetary policy affects the choice between housing tenure (rent
vs. own) and therefore the relative prices of the two change when interest rates change. From
our discussion in the previous section, for the purpose of computing the costs of shelter, most
of the information used in these calculations comes from the shelter rental market, which
leads to the shelter component of CPI behaving almost identically to shelter rents. With
this in mind, and with equation 2.1, we can now discuss when we expect to observe a price
puzzle based on our mechanism.
When the central bank increases interest rates it is normally for the purpose of reducing
inflation, that is, to reduce the growth rate of P(t). If the change in interest rates had
no effect on real prices of shelter and non-shelter goods then it should be expected that,
after a contractionary monetary policy shock, the impulse response function (IRF) of CPI
would be negative because the real prices of both goods would not change. According to our
mechanism, after a contractionary monetary policy shock, not only would P(t), the nominal
level of the economy, change, but possibly also R(t), the price of shelter services. In order
for this effect to generate a price puzzle it would be necessary that the effect of interest rates
on R(t), weighed by (1− α), be larger than the effect of interest rates on P(t):
If
∆P (t)
∆i
< (1− α)∆R(t)
∆i
=⇒ ∆CPI(t)
∆i
> 0 (2.2)
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From equation 2.2 it is straightforward to see that the smaller the weight of non-shelter
goods in total CPI – α – or the larger the response of shelter prices to interest rates, the
more likely it is that the overall CPI will increase after a contractionary monetary shock.5
This consideration implies that the ”size” of the price puzzle may be time varying, which is
consistent with the findings of Hanson (2004).
Importantly, and regardless of the overall effect of interest rates changes on total CPI being
positive or negative, based on this discussion, for monetary policy conduct and evaluation,
the shelter component of the CPI (or PCE, or deflator of GDP) should be excluded if the
goal is to measure the nominal state of the economy. In addition, this result also highlights
the importance of using data that are model consistent (or vice-versa).
2.4 Data
The data that we use in this paper come from multiple sources. The data used in the main
results were collected from the St. Louis Fed Fred economic database. We collected the same
four variables used in Sims (1992) – the federal funds rate (FFR), M1 money stock (M1SL),
industrial production (INDPRO), and CPI index (CPIAUCSL). In addition, we also collected
information for the consumer price index of rent of primary residence (CUSR0000SEHA)
and consumer price index of owners’ equivalent rent of residence (CUSR0000SEHC), which
we use to construct the variable CPI net of shelter. With the exception of the monetary
variables (M1SL and FFR), all series were seasonally adjusted and all variables but the
federal funds rate are in log levels. Although most of our data ranges from 1960 to 2006,
our main empirical results concern the period from 1983 to 2006. We restrict the sample to
this period because, as explained in section 2, the CPI suffered a major revision in 1983 that
changed the way shelter costs were estimated. In the same methodological revision, housing
prices were excluded from the CPI.
Because we perform various robustness checks of our main results and also show how
5Although our discussion here is informal, in Chapter 1 we add an endogenous housing tenure choice
to a standard New Keynesian model, which allows us to have a more formal and precise discussion of this
mechanism.
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our results compare to previous explanations of the price puzzle, we had to collect several
other data. As alternative inflation measures we use the personal consumption price index
(PCE) and the deflator of GDP. The former is observed at a monthly frequency, while the
latter is observed at a quarterly frequency. Both were obtained from the St. Louis Fed Fred
economic database and cover the period 1960 to 2006. As an alternative measure of monetary
policy shocks we use the Romer and Romer. (2004) monetary policy shocks measure, which
was updated to a more recent period by Coibion et al. (2012). To replicate the results of
Giordani (2004) we used the Federal Reserve Board measure of capacity utilization, which
we obtained from the St. Louis Fed Fred economic database. To replicate the results of
Brissimis and Magginas (2006) we used the composite index of leading indicators variable
that is published by the Conference Board and the expected federal funds rate for the current
month.6 Finally, in order to implement the FAVAR methodology of Bernanke et al. (2005),
we used an updated version of the original dataset covering the period 1960 to 2007 at a
monthly frequency.7
2.5 Empirical Results
2.5.1 SVAR Model and Identification Strategy
The SVAR model we estimate as well as the shock identification strategy we use in our
baseline results, correspond exactly to Sims (1992). That is, we estimate a SVAR model
with four variables: federal funds rate, industrial production index, M1 money stock, and
some measure of the price level. In the original paper, the author used the CPI as a measure
of the price level. In our application, we use the CPI, sub-components of the CPI, and
alternative measures of inflation like the PCE and the GDP deflator.
The identification of shocks in the SVAR model used to obtain the baseline results is based
on a Cholesky decomposition with the variables ordered as in Sims (1992): federal funds rate,
M1 money stock, price variable and industrial production index. In this shock identification
6This variable was kindly provided by TradeNavigator.com.
7We thank Dalibor Stevanovic for sharing these data with us.
46
strategy, the first variable contemporaneously affects all other variables; the second variable
affects all other variables contemporaneously but the first one; the third variable only affects
the fourth variable contemporaneously; and the fourth variable has no contemporaneous
effects on the other variables. In section 6 we present results with alternative identification
strategies to show that our main result does not depend on using a particular identification
strategy.
2.5.2 Main Results
Figure 2.2 summarizes our main result. In this figure we show the impulse response to a
positive federal funds rate shock of overall CPI and CPI net of shelter.
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Figure 2.2: Impulse response of CPI and CPI net of shelter to a federal funds rate shock for
1983:01 to 2006:12 period. Shelter only includes primary rent and owner equivalent rent.
The impulse response of overall CPI to an increase of the federal funds rate corresponds
to what is perceived as being puzzling and at odds with economic theory. After an increase
of the interest rate, CPI is above the baseline level for more than 30 months. In the the case
where we use CPI net of shelter, we still observe a period of around 14 months where CPI is
still above zero, but after 4 to 5 months the level is significantly lower than overall CPI and
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after 14 months it actually becomes negative, as would be expected. The reason why even
when we use CPI net of shelter we still observe an initial period where CPI is above zero
after a contractionary monetary shock is not easy to explain. This initial behavior could be
explained by the theory of the cost channel of monetary policy. It is also possible that there
are other products for which demand increases after a negative interest rate shock. In order
to test the first hypothesis we would need some information about the evolution of marginal
costs of production, while to test the second hypothesis we would have to search for products
for which prices vary in the same direction as interest rates. Unfortunately, information
on marginal costs of production is not easily available, and estimating price elasticities of
different product categories to interest rates is something we plan to do in future research.
An alternative explanation is that the identification strategy is not the most adequate one
and another should be considered. In the next section we perform several robustness check
exercises, including using different identification strategies.
Note in Figure 2.2 that, for the first 6 months, the impulse response of both series is
very similar, but around 7 months, while the response of CPI net of shelter starts declining,
the response of CPI starts increasing and only stops increasing around 11 months. This
behavior is consistent with our story but could also be due to some other factor. In order
to provide some evidence that this behavior is due to the increase in shelter prices after the
contractionary monetary shock, we estimate a four-variable SVAR model where, along with
the federal funds rate, industrial production index, and the M1 money stock, we include the
shelter price index.8 In Figure 2.3 we show the impulse responses of the shelter price index
to a contractionary monetary shock.
8The shelter price index is the same index that we exclude from the overall CPI to construct the CPI
net of shelter series. This series that we call shelter price index does not correspond exactly to what is
denominated as shelter by the BLS.
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Figure 2.3: Impulse response of shelter to a federal funds rate shock for 1983:01 to 2006:12
period.
The results shown in Figure 2.3 are in line with our interpretation of the behavior of the
impulse response of CPI.9 The response of shelter prices increases in three distinct periods,
around 3, 7 and 15 months. The increase around 3 months does not show in the response
of CPI, but the increase around 6 months coincides with the inversion of direction of the
impulse response function of CPI. In Figure 2.3 the response of shelter prices continues to
increase for almost 3 years while in Figure 2.2 the response of CPI peaks at 11 months.
Because the impulse response function is not linear, and because it depends on the behavior
of all variables in the system, the impulse response of CPI and shelter do not need to be
fully consistent with our story. Yet, in our view, both variables show a behavior in the first
periods of the response that is consistent with our story and with our interpretation of the
inversion of direction of the impulse response for CPI.
Two important questions that we have not addressed so far are whether the two impulse
response functions in Figure 2.2 are statistically different from each other and whether the
responses of the other variables in the model are similar when CPI or CPI net of shelter
9The result shown in Figure 2.3 is basically the same result shown in Duarte and Dias (2015), which led
us to write the present paper.
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are used. To answer these questions properly we would need to be able to compare impulse
response functions from non-nested models in a statistical way. Unfortunately, to the best
of our knowledge, there are no such tests and therefore the best we can do is show the
various impulse responses and let the reader judge for him/herself. In Figure 2.4 we show
the impulse responses with corresponding 68% confidence bands of all the variables included
in the SVAR model to a contractionary monetary policy shock.
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Figure 2.4: Impulse responses to a federal funds rate shock for 1983:1 to 2006:12 period.
Both shaded areas represent the 68% confidence intervals. The light area is associated with
the CPI, the medium area with the CPI net of shelter, and the darker area with the
intersection of the two.
With the exception of the responses of CPI and CPI net of shelter, the responses of
the other three variables are qualitatively similar in both specifications. We interpret this
similarity as evidence that our result is not driven by some strange response of one or more
variables included in the model. Also interesting to note is that only in the cases of CPI and
CPI net of shelter the 68% confidence bands of the two impulse response functions do not
overlap for most of the response horizon. We acknowledge that comparing the confidence
bands of two impulse response functions is not a formal test, but the fact that for CPI and
CPI net of shelter the two impulse response bands do not overlap is consistent with our
interpretation of the results. That is, the responses of CPI and CPI net of shelter to a
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contractionary monetary policy shock are economically different.
An additional interesting result regards the forecast error variance decomposition of the
two variables (CPI and CPI net of shelter). In Table 2.1 we show the forecast error variance
decomposition up to 48 periods. Although the two decompositions are not too different from
Forecast error variance decomposition
CPI
Step Std Error FF M1 CPI INDPRO
1 0.173 0.6 1.1 98.3 0.0
8 0.585 7.7 1.5 85.3 5.5
16 0.976 7.1 2.1 80.1 10.7
24 1.275 5.4 3.4 79.1 12.1
32 1.482 4.1 4.9 78.7 12.3
40 1.629 3.5 6.2 78.2 12.1
48 1.737 3.6 7.2 77.6 11.6
CPI net of shelter
Step Std Error FF M1 NETCPI INDPRO
1 0.246 0.0 1.4 98.6 0.0
8 0.804 2.8 1.8 90.8 4.6
16 1.328 1.2 4.0 85.3 9.5
24 1.709 1.5 7.3 81.4 9.8
32 1.951 3.5 10.6 77.5 8.4
40 2.123 6.7 12.9 73.2 7.2
48 2.264 10.6 13.8 69.0 6.6
Table 2.1: Forecast error variance decomposition of CPI and CPI net of shelter.
each other, the decomposition of CPI net of shelter puts a smaller weight in the contribution
of industrial production, and more on the other three variables – 11.6% after 48 periods in
the case of CPI and only 6.6% in the case of CPI net of shelter. Since inflation is inherently
a nominal variable, it is sensible that in the long run it is mostly driven by nominal shocks
and not by real shocks.
51
2.6 Robustness Checks
2.6.1 Alternative Identification Strategies
As mentioned previously, the identification strategy that we use to obtain the main results
is not unique and other strategies could be justified. We do not have a strong preference for
a particular identification strategy. Instead, we are mostly concerned about showing that
our results do not depend on the identification strategy that is used. In this regard, we try
two different orderings of variables in the SVAR model.
It is difficult to argue that the monetary authority knows the price level and industrial
production when using monthly data. Still, the monetary authority has weekly and daily
information on variables that can give an idea of what is happening with the price level and
industrial production in any given month. In particular, the BLS typically collects price
data in the middle of the month while the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meets
either in the middle or at the end of the month. We present here two different orderings:
one where the monetary authority observes contemporaneously industrial production and
the price level, as in Christiano et al. (1996), and one where it just observes the price level.
Results of the these two alternative identification strategies are presented in Figures 2.5 and
2.6, respectively.
From Figures 2.5 and 2.6 we conclude that our baseline results do not depend on the
ordering of the variables in the VAR since alternative variable orderings generate results that
are qualitatively similar. That is, not only does the response of CPI net of shelter become
negative much faster than the response of CPI, but we also observe that the response of CPI
inverts the direction around 7 months.
Given the recursive identification approach, it can be argued that the identification of
the monetary policy shock is different when using CPI net of shelter instead of CPI. The
monetary policy authority certainly responds to CPI but the same cannot be claimed for
CPI net of shelter. One way of accommodating this criticism is to use the Romer and Romer.
(2004) measure of monetary policy shocks (updated to a more recent time period by Coibion
et al. (2012)). As argued by Romer and Romer. (2004), this measure of monetary shocks is
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Figure 2.5: Impulse response of CPI and CPI net of shelter to a federal funds rate shock
from 1983:01 to 2006:12 period for alternative ordering: industrial production, price level,
interest rate, and money aggregate.
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Figure 2.6: Impulse Response of CPI and CPI net of shelter to a federal funds rate shock
from 1983:01 to 2006:12 period for alternative ordering: price level, interest rate, money
aggregate, and industrial production.
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robust to anticipatory and endogenous actions of the monetary policy authority. In this way,
we can compare responses of CPI and CPI net of shelter that use the same identification.
The corresponding results are shown in Figure 2.7.
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Figure 2.7: Impulse response of CPI and CPI net of shelter to a monetary policy shock
(Romer and Romer. (2004) and Coibion et al. (2012)) 1983:01 to 2006:12 period.
The same qualitative results are obtained once again. However, some differences are
observed. The price puzzle is ”smaller” for CPI than when a recursive identification is used.
This result is not new; it has already been reported in Romer and Romer. (2004). With
this identification, nevertheless, we still see the same ordering of impulse responses we saw
previously. The response of CPI stays positive for a longer period than the response of CPI
net of shelter – approximately 15 months for the former and approximately 5 months for
the latter. Hence, there is a difference of almost a year between the two different measures
in terms of positive response and of approximately 0.1 standard deviations in terms of
quantitative difference from 15 months forward.
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2.6.2 Alternative Measures of Inflation
To show that our results do not depend on the measure of the price level that is used, we
estimate the same model used to obtain our baseline results, but instead of using CPI, we
use the PCE and the GDP deflator. Figures 2.8 and 2.9 show the results when the PCE and
the GDP deflator are considered, respectively.
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Figure 2.8: Impulse response of PCE and PCE net of shelter to a federal funds rate shock
from 1983:01 to 2006:12 period. Shelter only includes primary rent and owner equivalent
rent.
Similar to what was observed in Figure 2.2, we see in Figures 2.8 and 2.9 that when we
exclude shelter from the price index (PCE or GDP deflator) the response of prices to a
contractionary monetary policy shock becomes negative much faster than when shelter is
included.
In the case of the PCE, the result based on overall PCE is already quite satisfactory, as
after 15 months the impulse response crosses the zero line and becomes negative. However,
despite the initial result not being as strange as in the case of the CPI, when we use PCE net
of shelter a measure of the price level the impulse response becomes negative after 6 months,
which is much quicker than in the case of overall PCE. It is important to notice that the
initial result is not as strange as in the case of CPI because the weight of shelter in the PCE
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Figure 2.9: Impulse response of GDP deflator and GDP deflator net of shelter to a federal
funds rate shock from 1983:01 to 2006:4 period for quarterly data. Shelter only includes
primary rent and owner equivalent rent.
is only 15% while it is close to 30% in CPI. Besides the difference in the weight of shelter,
the PCE also differs from the CPI in terms of how the weights used in the computation
of the index change over time. In the CPI, these weights are fixed for a fairly long period
of time (more than 1 year). In the PCE, the weights used in its computation adjust every
month based on the quantities consumed of each good or service.
For the GDP deflator, we also obtain a similar result. When we exclude shelter from this
price index, the impulse response becomes negative more quickly (between three and four
quarters) than when shelter is included.
2.6.3 The Original Puzzle Dissected
As explained previously, in 1983 there was a major revision in the methodology used in the
construction of the CPI. Among other changes, the concept of owners’ equivalent rent was
introduced and the cost of home ownership item was removed from the index. This change
brings naturally the investigation of the pre-1983 period as a robustness check. Figure 2.10
shows results based on the sample used in the original article as well as results for two sub-
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samples – before and after 1983. Given our previous discussion, it would be expected that
the price puzzle would be ”worse” after 1983 because that corresponds to the period with a
higher weight of shelter. This hypothesis is confirmed in Figure 2.10, where it can be seen
that the CPI impulse response function is positive for more than 48 months. Also interesting
is that only in the post-1983 sample is a change of direction of the impulse response function
observed. This inversion of direction also takes place at around 8 months, and the impulse
response stabilizes around month 13/14. Regarding the pre-1983 sub-period we observe a
slightly ”smaller” puzzle than the original.
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Figure 2.10: The original price puzzle presented in Sims (1992) and its breakdown in the
before and after 1983 sub-periods.
If we compare the original puzzle with the puzzle presented in our main results, it is
possible to see how similar they are. Both become negative around 35 months. However,
the positive response is stronger in the original puzzle than the response of CPI shown in
Figure 2.2. In the original puzzle, the positive response peaks at more than 0.2% while
in our baseline result peaks at less than 0.1%. This result seems to be at odds with our
mechanism since the original puzzle was based on a sample where housing shelter had less
weight (around 6%) and housing prices were part of the CPI. This motivates breaking down
the period pre-1983 to investigate what dynamics are in place.
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Figure 2.11: The 1960-1982 period and its breakdown between the pre- and stagflation
decades.
Figure 2.11 shows the breakdown in two sub-samples. From 1960:1 to 1969:12 the result
is what would be expected if the mechanism proposed in this paper was relevant. That is,
in a period where house rents had a very small weight in overall CPI, the response of prices
to a contractionary monetary shock is negative, as theory would predict.
The results presented in Figures 2.10 and 2.11 seem to suggest that the original puzzle
was mainly driven by the 1970:1 to 1982:12 period and the change in the calculation of
shelter costs. It is well known that the 1970s was a turbulent period in economic terms
with the occurrence of oil shocks, high inflation, and experimentation with monetary policy.
The fact that the original puzzle is partially driven by the 1970:1 to 1982:12 period helps in
understanding why the inclusion of commodity prices helped explaining the puzzle, but this
link disappeared in more recent periods, as was pointed out by Hanson (2004). However,
in Figure 2.11 we can see how using the commodity prices did not correct much of the
puzzle even for the 1970:1 to 1982:12 period. This finding is similar to Romer and Romer.
(2004), who show how small the response of the price level is to monetary policy shocks
(their own measure and actual federal funds rate) when commodity prices are included. One
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final remark about the results in Figures 2.10 and 2.11 is that for all cases where a pre-1983
sample was used, we do not observe an inversion of the CPI impulse response function.
That is, in these cases, there are no instances in which the impulse response starts declining
and then starts increasing again, as was the case for impulse responses based on post-1983
samples.
2.7 Alternative Explanations of the Price Puzzle
As discussed in the introduction, there are several explanations for the price puzzle, each
with its own merits. We do not want to discuss whether our explanation is better than
existing ones nor take a stand on which explanation is our preferred one. Instead, we want
to see how our explanation fits with existing ones. To do so, we replicate some of the
leading explanations of the price puzzle incorporating our idea. We choose four alternative
explanations: 1) exclusion of a measure of output gap — Giordani (2004); 2) exclusion
of forward looking variables — Brissimis and Magginas (2006); 3) insufficient controlling
for other variables used in the information set of the central banker — FAVAR model of
Bernanke et al. (2005); 4) theory based – sign restriction method of Uhlig (2005).10
2.7.1 Output Gap
Giordani (2004) argues that the SVAR model used by Sims (1992) is misspecified, and this
misspecification lead to a spurious price puzzle. The source of the misspecification is the
inclusion of a measure of GDP (or industrial production) instead of using a measure of
output gap. In Figure 2.12 we show the impulse response function of CPI and CPI net of
a shelter to a contractionary monetary policy shock in the context of a model with output
gap (left panel) and with GDP (right panel). As is visible in Figure 2.12, the SVAR model
with output gap delivers results where there is almost no price puzzle for both CPI and CPI
net of shelter, but it also shows that CPI net of shelter responds more negatively than CPI
10To be fair to the author, the main goal of Uhlig (2005) is to study the effects of monetary policy shocks
on output, and in order to better identify monetary policy shocks, the author imposes restrictions on the
response of prices.
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to the same monetary shock. In the case of the SVAR model that uses GDP, the response
of CPI is always positive for the first four years, while the response of CPI net of shelter
becomes negative after two years. These results make it very clear that the point made by
Giordani (2004) is important, but the results also show that using the response of inflation to
monetary shocks is quicker than what is implied by the response of CPI. From our discussion
in section 2, the fact that rents increase after a contractionary monetary policy shock does
not always lead to a price puzzle, but the response of CPI is always a combination of two
distinct responses: the response of the shelter and the non-shelter components of CPI.
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Figure 2.12: Impulse responses to a federal funds rate shock for 1983:1 to 2006:4 period
with an output gap measure as in Giordani (2004). The left panel reports the response of
price level to the full specification with output gap and the left panel with GDP instead of
output gap.
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2.7.2 Forward-Looking Variables
Brissimis and Magginas (2006) also argue that the original SVAR model used by Sims (1992)
is misspecified. According to these authors, the Sims (1992) SVAR model is misspecified
because it does not include any forward-looking variable to help with the identification of
shocks. To correct this misspecification, the authors add to the SVAR model of Sims (1992)
a measure of expected economic activity and a measure of expected interest rates. The
measure of expected economic activity is treated as endogenous, while the second is treated
as exogenous. We replicate this approach with both CPI and CPI net of shelter (Figure
2.13). We consider the cases of adding both variables to the empirical, and only adding the
expected economic activity variable. Similar to Giordani (2004), the new model specification
defended by Brissimis and Magginas (2006) improves the results significantly. At the same
time, we also find a similar result to what we showed in the previous sub-section. That is,
the response of CPI net of shelter is much quicker than the response of CPI and, in the case
of just using the expected economic activity indicator, the response of CPI net of shelter
becomes negative before the response of CPI.
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Figure 2.13: Impulse responses to a federal funds rate shock for 1989:1 to 2006:12 period
with forward-looking information variables as in Brissimis and Magginas (2006). The left
panel reports the response of price level to the full specification with federal funds futures
rate (FFF) and composite leading indicator of economic activity (LCOM). The right panel
only includes LCOM.
2.7.3 FAVAR
Bernanke et al. (2005) propose a new econometric method that allows for richer information
environments while keeping the model fairly parsimonious. This model is known as a factor
augmented vector autoregressive (FAVAR) model. The basic idea is to condense a large
set of variables into just a few number of factors and then use these factors and other
variables of interest in a SVAR model. One of the by products of this new approach is that
the impulse response of CPI to a contractionary monetary policy shock is much more in
line with economic theory. To show that our result still holds, we replicate the results of
Bernanke et al. (2005) using data from 1959:01 to 2006:12 together with the variable CPI
net of shelter, which only covers the period from 1983:01 to 2006:12. The impulse responses
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to a contractionary monetary policy shock of CPI and CPI net of shelter based on a FAVAR
model are shown in Figure 2.14.11
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Figure 2.14: Impulse responses of CPI and CPI net of shelter to a federal funds rate shock
for 1959:01 to 2006:12 period using a three factors FAVAR model as in Bernanke et al.
(2005) while adding CPI net of Shelter to the sample.
The results could not be clearer. In the case of the response of CPI, although it turns
negative more quickly than in our baseline case (Figure 2.2), it still takes about 18 months
to become negative. At the same time, the response of CPI net of shelter is never positive
and it corresponds to what theory predicts.
Despite this result being very favorable to our main point, we must acknowledge that the
comparison of the two responses is somewhat unfair because the two variables cover different
time periods. In the case of CPI it includes the period of the 1970s which is known to be a
conturbated period. In Figure 2.15, we show the impulse response of CPI net of a shelter
and of CPI pre-1983 and post-1983.
11CPI net of shelter is only defined for the period from 1983:01 to 2006:12 because the concept of owner
equivalent rent was only introduced in 1983. However, the method allows us to use variables with different
time periods.
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Figure 2.15: Impulse responses of CPI pre-1983, CPI post-1983 and CPI net of shelter to a
federal Funds Rate Shock for 1959:01 to 2006:12 period using FAVAR with three factors
and sample just as in Bernanke et al. (2005) while adding CPI net of shelter to the sample.
In this case, the response of CPI pre-1983 takes more than two years to become negative,
while the response of CPI post-1983 is always negative. In the case of CPI net of shelter,
the result is basically the same as in Figure 2.14. We would like to highlight the fact that,
once again, there is a considerable difference in the responses of CPI and CPI net of shelter,
with the latter being more responsive than the former.
2.7.4 Sign Restriction
Finally, we show how the results change when a pure sign restriction is used as an iden-
tification strategy. In this case, the monetary policy shock is identified by restricting the
signs of selected impulse functions for a fixed number of periods. We follow Uhlig (2005)
and eliminate the price puzzle by construction by restricting the interest rate response to be
positive, the price level to be negative, and money aggregate to be negative for five months.
We leave the industrial production response unrestricted. Hence, this is an agnostic identi-
fication with respect to output. This alternative identification is important to help separate
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the misspecification problem of our mechanism. Figure 2.16 shows the results.
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Figure 2.16: Pure sign restriction agnostic with respect to output. Impulse response
functions sign restricted for five months (k = 5). The variables restricted are the same as
in Uhlig (2005) with interest rate being positive, money aggregate negative, and CPI
negative for the restricted periods. 1983:01 to 2006:12 period.
We see once again a sharp difference in the response of CPI net of shelter in comparison
to the response of CPI. These results are not directly comparable to the ones presented pre-
viously, but they share at least one important common feature: CPI net of shelter responds
more quickly to a monetary shock than overall CPI.
When some variable is not model consistent and a pure sign restriction is used the results
obtained may be hiding some important issues. By digging deeper, we were able to unveil
an important feature of the CPI that we believe to be very important for monetary policy.
2.8 Conclusion
In this paper we take into account the effects of monetary policy on housing tenure choice
and the weight of shelter in the CPI to explain the price puzzle. After an increase in interest
rates, more people will want to rent instead of own and this shift in consumption behavior
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increases the price of rents in comparison to all other goods. We provide a simple theoretical
framework (the effect of monetary policy on housing tenure choice) for why housing rents
may increase after a contractionary monetary policy shock. This mechanism is different
from the cost channel literature, and our empirical results suggest that it is relevant in
explaining the price puzzle. Our results are qualitatively robust to different identification
strategies, measures of inflation, sample periods, and they compare well against alternative
explanations.
In our opinion, these results would be interesting on their own, but they may be signifi-
cantly more far-reaching than just explaining the price puzzle. While providing a possible
explanation for the price puzzle, we showed that, when we exclude shelter from the CPI, in-
flation seems to be much less persistent than previously thought. More generally, the results
of this paper highlight the importance of measuring inflation in a theoretically consistent
way to better separate price changes cause by inflation from price changes caused by relative
price changes.
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CHAPTER 3
SERVICE SECTOR’S PRODUCTIVITY
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN EUROPE AND US:
WHY IS EUROPE FALLING BEHIND?
3.1 Introduction
Average annual labor productivity growth (measured as GDP per hour of work) in the
United States accelerated from 1.2 percent in the 1973-1995 period to 2.3 percent from 1995
to 2006. Conversely, the 15 European Union countries that constituted the union up to
2004 experienced a productivity growth slowdown between these two time periods. Slower
labor productivity growth in Europe than in the United States since 1995 reverses a long-
term pattern of convergence. One of the key questions is what factors are behind this large
difference in productivity growth between Europe and the US? Moreover, how can they help
explain the slowdown in productivity growth in Europe relative to the US?
The objective of this paper is to identify factors that can explain differences in the service
sector’s productivity between Europe and the US. Our approach to identify these factors
is two-folded. First, we break down the service sector and extend a standard structural
transformation model of Duarte and Restuccia (2010) to investigate how the structural
transformation within the service sector affects the labor productive of the service sector.
We show that indeed a compositional analyses of the service sector reveal that the differences
in the service sector’s productivity between different Europe and the US are the result of
differences in labor productivity in trade, food and accommodation, transportation, storage
and communication. Second, we explore the EU KLEMS data set to empirically investigate
if differences in labor market regulation help explain the differences in the service sector’s
productivity. Our preliminary results suggest that labor market regulation associated with
Joint work with Cesare Buiatti and Luis Felipe Sa´enz.
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labor market rigidity is negatively correlated with service labor productivity.
Inklaar et al. (2008) give an initial analysis on the subject and provide some insights
on what factors might be behind these differences in productivity between Europe and
US. They find that the most important factors are the lower growth contributions from
investment in information and communication technology in Europe, the relatively small
share of technology producing industries in Europe, and slower multifactor productivity
growth. In particular, they find that this effect is more notorious in the service sector.
Hence, the authors conclude that the service sector is the major issue in Europe’s slowdown
of labor productivity and suggest that further investigation of the productivity differences
between US and Europe should be centred around the service sector.
Duarte and Restuccia (2010) provide further evidence that the differences in the service
sector’s productivity across countries help explain the differences in aggregate productivity.
They constructed a structural transformation model in order to build comparable measures
of productivity across different countries. However, the question remains. What are the
factors that help explain differences in service sector’s productivity? In this paper we shed
light on what factors are potentially important in explaining these differences.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in section 3.2 we show and discuss the stylized
facts of structural transformation of the economy and within service sector; in section 3.3 we
present a simple conceptual framework that extends the standard structural transformation
model to include service sub-sectors; in section 3.4 we show our preliminary empirical work
on labor regulation and service sector labor productivity ; and in section 3.5 we conclude.
3.2 Stylized Facts
The European countries experienced a strong catch up with the US in aggregate labor
productivity between the 70’s and 90’. However, at some point in the 90’s this process was
halted and the trend of catch up was replaced by one of retrogress. The experience of the
relative performance in labor productivity of our sample European countries can be seen in
Figure 3.1. It is clear that for the European Countries, besides Netherlands, there was a
large change in trend in the relative performance to the US in labor productivity. What
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could potentially be behind such a dramatic change in relative performance?
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Figure 3.1: Relative GDP per employment in each European country relative to that of the
United States.
Looking at the question through the lens of structural transformation, Duarte and Restuc-
cia (2010) show that the answer seems to be in the lack of catch up in labor productivity
of the service sector by the European countries. These countries are at a late stage in the
structural transformation process, thus with a high labor share allocated in the service sector
(Figure B.1 in appendix B). At the same time, the labor productivity in services is remark-
ably different between the US and Europe, with the European countries being much less
productive in levels and growth rates. When combining both facts, Duarte and Restuccia
(2010) showed that most of the lack of catch up in the aggregate productivity between Eu-
ropean countries and US can be explained by the lack of catch up in labor productivity in
the service sector.
Why is the service sector labor productivity in European countries falling behind the US?
This is the main question of interest in this paper. Our strategy to answer this question is
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going to be built upon two observations. The first observation is that the service sector is
very heterogeneous, and the second observation is that labor market regulation is remarkably
different between the European countries and the US. Labor market regulation that affects
labor rigidity can affect labor productivity. For example, a firm that hires an employee that
is not productive but that because of labor rigidity is hard to fire can reduce the overall
productivity of that specific firm. We explore if indeed the differences in labor regulation
help explain the service sector’s labor productivity differences in section 3.4. In the next
section we explore the first observation by breaking down the service sector and investigate
what types of services are more responsible for the lack of catch up in labor productivity of
the service sector.
3.2.1 Breaking Down the Service Sector
Using the EU KLEMS1 data, we break drown the service sector into four sub-sectors: Trade,
food and accommodation (TFA); transportation, storage and communication (TSC); finance,
real estate and business (FRB); and government and others (GO). Trade, food and accom-
modation includes whole sale and retail, while government and other include personal, health
and education services. The service sector could potentially be even more disaggregated as
these for sub-categories still have a great deal of heterogeneity. However, data limitation
only allows us to reach this disaggregation level. We first show the structural transforma-
tion of each service sector sub-category across countries, and secondly we show the labor
productivity for each sub-category across countries.
A. Service Industries Labor Allocation Across Countries
The structural transformation within the service sector varies across different sub-categories.
From Figure 3.2, one can conclude that the rise in the service sector labor share has been
driven mostly by finance, real estate business, government and others. In other words, from
the labor that has been allocated to services, most of it has been allocated to finance, real
1For more details on this data set, see O’Mahony and Timmer (2009).
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estate and business, and government and others. At the same time, very few new labor that
is allocated in services is allocated to transportation, storage and communication, and trade,
food and accommodation. In fact, the labor share in TSC has gone down for the US.
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Figure 3.2: Labor shares as a percentage of total employment in the economy for each
service sub-sector.
In addition, although the trends of structural transformation are similar across countries,
the levels are different. For instance, the US has the highest labor share in TFA by a large
margin and the lowest in TSC. The US has approximately 7% more of total labor allocated
to TFA than Germany. Hence, even if labor productivity of each specific sub-category was
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the same across countries, this disaggregated structural transformation of the service sector
could explain why the aggregate service sector labor productivity is different across countries
and how it changed over time.
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Figure 3.3: Labor shares as a percentage of service sector total employment for each service
sub-sector.
In order to see how the labor allocation of each sub-category changed relative to services
only, we plot the labor share as a percentage of service total employment instead of the
economy total employment in Figure 3.3. Inside the service sector, TFA and TSC have
72
been reducing their importance in total service employment from 1978 to 2010, while GO
have been stable, and finally FRB has increased substantially its share in service total
employment. From this figure, it is clear that GO constitute the largest share of services
in our sample economies, being almost half of total services and stable over time. Hence,
one can conclude that from the labor allocated to services, approximately half of it has been
allocated to GO over time.
Structural transformation studies the allocation of labor between agriculture, manufac-
turing and services, and in this paper we test whether the same forces that drive structural
transformation could also help explain the allocation of labor across service sub-sectors. If
a substitution effect is taking place between service sub-sectors like in Ngai and Pissarides
(2007), we could potentially explain the allocation of labor of the service sub-sectors by
looking at the paths of labor productivity of these same sub-sectors. We will test this idea
in the future with a calibrated version of the model proposed in this paper. For now, we
will show in the next section the labor productivity growth rate of each sub-category across
country.
B. Service Industries Productivity Across Countries
The United States has the highest annualized growth rate of service labor productivity
between 1978 and 2010 at approximately 1.3%. One way to understand why this is the case
is to analyse the labor productivity growth of each sub-category of the service sector. Figure
3.4 plots the annualized growth rate of labor productivity in each service sub-sector against
the annualized growth rate of aggregate service labor productivity for all countries in our
data set. The service sub-sectoral growth rate of the United States in each scatter plot is
identified by the horizontal dashed line, whereas the vertical dashed line marks the growth
rate of aggregate service labor productivity of the United States.
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Figure 3.4: Aggregate service labor productivity is value added per employee, whereas
service sub-sectoral labor productivity is value added per employee in each sub-sector.
Annualized percentage growth rates during the sample period (1978-2010) are given for
each country. The horizontal lines indicate the services sub-sectoral growth rates observed
in the United States, and the vertical line indicates the aggregate service sector labor
productivity growth rate of the United States.
Figure 3.4 illustrates that the labor productivity growth is the highest in TSC and second
in TFA, being basically null in FRB and GO in all countries. This shows that service’s
labor productivity growth happens only in TFA and TSC. In addition, the figure also shows
that the European countries have lower labor productivity growth than the US in TFA and
TSC. This suggests that the lack of catch up in the European countries comes from lack of
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catch up in TFA and TSC. For example, France that has the growth in labor productivity
in TSC and TFA closest to the US has also the closest rate of growth rate in the aggregate
service labor productivity at approximately 1.2%, while countries that were far in these same
sub-sectors such as Italy and Netherlands had the poorest performance relative to the US
in service aggregate labor productivity.
Motivated by the change in trend in the relative performance of the European countries
relative to the US (with the exception of Netherlands) we analyse the annualized growth
rate of labor productivity for each sub-sector pre and post 1995. In Figure 3.5 we start
by plotting the pre 1995 scatter plot. It is interesting that the catch up in output was
driven also by catching up in the service sector. Besides Netherlands, all countries had a
better performance in service’s labor productivity growth than the US. Breaking down the
service sector, the good relative performance in services for that period seems to come from
outperforming the US in FRB and GO while keeping up with the US in TFA and TSC;
contrary to what was observed when looking at the entire sample period.
Somewhere in the 90’s, the process of catch up in services was halted in the European
countries. Figure 3.6 shows that for the post 1995 period, all European countries were lagging
behind in service productivity, with average labor productivity of the European countries
being less than half of that of the US. Moreover, the FRB that was a source of catch up in
services pre 1995 became a source of divergence post 1995. The GO was the only sub-sector
that did not suffer any major change and the productivity were null during the entire period
and in the sub-periods as well.
Figures 3.5 and 3.6 also illustrate that the change in trend in the relative performance in
labor productivity was carried by both increase in the US labor efficiency and a reduction in
the European countries efficiency. The US tremendously increased its labor productivity in
FRB, going from negative labor productivity growth rate pre 1995 to a 2% growth rate in
post 1995. In addition, the US also improved 1 percentage point in productivity growth rate
in TFA and TSC. At the same time, all the European countries that enjoyed a growth rate
above 1% in service sector productivity pre 1995, dropped their rate of labor productivity
growth in services to less than 1% post 1995.
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Figure 3.5: Aggregate service labor productivity is value added per employee, whereas
service sub-sectoral labor productivity is value added per employee in each sub-sector.
Annualized percentage growth rates during the sample period (1978-1995) are given for
each country. The horizontal lines indicate the services sub-sectoral growth rates observed
in the United States, and the vertical line indicates the aggregate service sector labor
productivity growth rate of the United States.
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Figure 3.6: Aggregate service labor productivity is value added per employee, whereas
service sub-sectoral labor productivity is value added per employee in each sub-sector.
Annualized percentage growth rates during the sample period (1995-2010) are given for
each country. The horizontal lines indicate the services sub-sectoral growth rates observed
in the United States, and the vertical line indicates the aggregate service sector labor
productivity growth rate of the United States.
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3.3 Theoretical Framework
We propose an extension to the structural transformation model of Duarte and Restuc-
cia (2010) by adding a layer of disaggregation in the service sector. The objective of this
extended model is to study how each service sub-category affected the aggregate labor pro-
ductivity.
Following Duarte and Restuccia (2010) and Rogerson (2008), two forces drive the alloca-
tion of labor across different sectors2: non-homothetic preferences (Kongsamut et al. (2001))
and substitution effect due to different productivity growth rates across sectors (Ngai and
Pissarides (2007)). However, the labor reallocation across service sub-categories is driven by
substitution effect only.
3.3.1 Baseline Structural Transformation Model
The baseline model is a replica of Duarte and Restuccia (2010). Three goods are produced
at each period: agriculture, manufacturing and service. The production technology of each
sector is given by:
Yi = AiLi, i ∈ {a,m, s} (3.1)
where Yi is output in sector i, Li is labor input in sector i, and Ai is a sector-specific tech-
nology parameter. Here, Ai resumes all the factors that could affect labor productivity such
as information technology3 and capital. We assume perfect competition and a continuum of
homogeneous firms. In each period, given output price pi and wage w, a representative firm
in sector i faces the following problem:
max
Li≥0
{piAiLi − wLi} (3.2)
The economy is populated by an infinitely lived representative household of constant
2For a detailed treatment of these two forces see Herrendorf et al. (2013).
3The EU KLEMS data has some information regarding the usage of information technology by each
sector. In future work we want to explore empirically how this affects the labor productivity in each service
sub-sector.
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size one. The household is endowed with L units of time each period, which are supplied
inelastically to the market. We associate L with being employed in the data. The household
has preferences over consumption goods as follows:
max
ci
{
a log (ca − a¯) + (1− a)1
ρ
log [bcρm + (1− b)(cs + s¯)ρ]
}
(3.3)
s.t.
paca + pmcm + pscs = wL
where a¯ > 0 is a subsistence level of agricultural goods. These preferences are important
in the realm of the development literature and it has been highlighted as a quantitatively
important feature leading to the movement of labor away from agriculture in the process
of structural transformation4. And where s¯ > 0, b ∈ (0, 1), and ρ < 1. The a¯, subsistence
level of agricultural goods, and the s¯, negative subsistence level of service goods, imply that
preferences are non-homothetic preferences. For s¯ > 0, these preferences imply the income
elasticity of service goods is greater than one. The negative subsistence consumption level s¯
implies that at low levels of income the households allocate less resources to the production
of services, while when at high levels of income the reverse is true. The parameter s¯ can also
be interpreted as a constant level of production of service goods at home.
The market clears each period whereby the total demand for labor equals the exogenous
supply of labor, and consumption of each good equals supply.
La + Lm + Ls = L (3.4)
ca = Ya, cm = Ym, cs = Ys (3.5)
A competitive equilibrium in this economy is a set of prices {pa, pm, ps}, allocations
4See, for instance, Echevarria (1997) , Laitner (2000) , Kongsamut et al. (2001) , Gollin et al. (2002), and
Restuccia et al. (2008).
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{ca, cm, cs} for the household, and allocations {La, Lm, Ls} for firms such that (i) given
prices, firm’s allocations {La, Lm, Ls} solve the firm’s problem in (3.2); (ii) given prices,
household’s allocations {ca, cm, cs} solve the household’s problem in (3.3); and (iii) markets
clear: equations (3.4) and (3.5) hold.
The first order conditions associated with the firms optimization problem imply that when
the wage is normalized to 1, the good prices are given by:
pi =
1
Ai
(3.6)
The good prices are inversely related with labor productivity and are affect by the pro-
ductivity only. And the first order conditions of the households problem using the price
solution imply that the labor share in agriculture is given by:
La = (1− a) a¯
Aa
+ a
(
L+
s¯
As
)
(3.7)
The households first order conditions also imply that the labor share of manufacturing id
given by:
Lm =
(L− La) + s¯/As
1 + x
(3.8)
where,
x =
(
b
1− b
)1/(ρ−1)(
Am
As
)ρ/(ρ−1)
Finally using market clearing in the labor market, the labor share in services is given by:
Ls = 1− La − Lm (3.9)
3.3.2 Extending the Baseline Structural Transformation Model
We extend the baseline model by including additional four service sub-sectors in the economy.
Hence, now we have production of goods that follows the same production technology as
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before. Hence, producers of these four service sub-categories face the same problem as in the
previous section. Preferences, with respect to agriculture, manufacturing and service goods
are the same. However, now the service good is going to be a composite good of the four
sub-service sector goods given by the following CES aggregate:
cs =
[
4∑
j=1
cσsj
]1/σ
(3.10)
where σ < 1, being the parameter that controls the elasticity of substitution between these
four service goods. Hence, now the households will have a two stages optimization. In the
first one, agents face the optimization problems of the previous section and in the second
stage they will solve for each individual service good:
max
csj

[
4∑
j=1
cσsj
]1/σ (3.11)
s.t.
4∑
j=1
psjcsj =
pscs
wL
where ps, the price of the service composite good is given by the following price aggregate:
ps =
[
4∑
j=1
p
σ/(σ−1)
sj
](σ−1)/σ
(3.12)
Market clearing will be an expanded version of the baseline model given by:
La + Lm + Ls = L (3.13)
Ls =
4∑
j=1
Lsj (3.14)
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ca = Ya, cm = Ym, cs = Ys (3.15)
cs1 = Ys1, cs2 = Ys2 cs3 = Ys3 cs4 = Ys4 (3.16)
The first order conditions associated with the firms of the service sub-sector again imply
that prices are going to be inversely related with the labor productivity of each individual
sub-sector.
psj =
1
Asj
(3.17)
And the households second stage first order conditions imply that the consumption of
each service is given by:
csj = cs
[
ps
psj
]1/(1−σ)
(3.18)
Using market clearing conditions and and 3.17 one finds that the sub-sector labor shares
are given by:
Lsj = Ls
[
Asj
As
] σ
(1−σ)
(3.19)
Note that only the substitution effect is at work in the structural transformation of the
service sub-sectors. In future work, our objective is to calibrate ρ to match the labor shares
of the service sub-sectors in the US. This will allows us to use the model to pin down the
initial labor productivity level of each individual service sub-sector across countries, thus
allowing for important comparisons of productivity in the service sectors between different
countries. This is an important feature as there is no service sub-sector value added PPP
adjusted. This could potentially overcome some of the problems stated in Baily and Solow
(2001).
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3.4 Labor Market Regulation and Service Sector Labor
Productivity
In this section, we show our preliminary results for the empirical investigation of the effect
of labor market regulation on service sector labor productivity. Table 3.1 show the effect of
labor market regulation indicators (OECD) on value added per worker (EU KLEMS). These
estimates are from a balanced panel from 1985-2010 using fixed effects. We find that an
increase in the notice period, which can be interpreted as an increase in labor market rigidity,
is negatively correlated with service sector productivity. Moreover, with the exception of
GO, is consistent with each individual sub-sector. However, the intensity of the negative
correlation is different, with TSC and TFA being the most affected by an increase in the
notice period. When the notice period increases, a firm that wants to fire an unproductive
worker needs to stay with the worker longer, thus decreasing the overall productivity. The
same idea goes along the lines of an increase in the trial period. Even if a firm has a poor
evaluation of a new worker, with a rise in the trial period, it needs to wait longer to finally
fire the worker which again decreases overall productivity. Nevertheless, it is interesting to
note that the effect is affects all sub-categories now.
We find preliminary indirect evidence of experience on labor productivity since an increase
in the limits to fixed-term employment are negatively correlated with labor productivity. In
other words, when the limits to fixed-term employment increase, firms need to use more
temporary labor force and this seems to be negatively correlated with labor productivity.
Hence, fixed contracts that are associated with workers that stay longer on the jobs are
associated with high productivity, thus implying that workers with higher experience are
more productive.
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Total Services FRB Services GO Services TFA Services TSC Services
Notice Period (9 month tenure) -0.916*** -0.008 -0.874** -1.677*** -3.360***
(0.295) (0.207) (0.374) (0.582) (0.766)
Severance (9 month tenure) 1.297* 1.974*** -0.158 2.779** 2.642
(0.689) (0.485) (0.875) (1.362) (1.792)
Def. justified dismissal 1.101** 0.836** -1.008 -1.150 7.503***
(0.547) (0.385) (0.695) (1.081) (1.422)
Trial period -1.589*** -1.066*** -1.685*** -2.246*** -1.954**
(0.290) (0.204) (0.369) (0.574) (0.755)
Limits to fixed-term empl. -0.972*** -0.481*** -1.267*** -1.444*** -1.257***
(0.139) (0.098) (0.176) (0.274) (0.361)
Max. succ. fixed-term empl. 0.472*** 0.183* 0.207 -0.209 2.179***
(0.142) (0.100) (0.180) (0.281) (0.369)
Max. cumul. duration fixed-term 1.607*** 0.936*** 1.959*** 1.663*** 3.246***
(0.310) (0.218) (0.394) (0.613) (0.806)
Cases for TWA empl. -1.160*** -0.572** 0.394 -1.918*** -4.651***
(0.357) (0.251) (0.453) (0.706) (0.928)
Restriction on TWA renewal 2.512*** 1.878*** 2.327*** 4.874*** 2.453
(0.611) (0.430) (0.776) (1.208) (1.589)
Table 3.1: The effect of labor market regulation indicators (OECD) on value added per
worker (EU KLEMS). These estimates are from a balanced panel for the 1985-2010 period
using fixed effects.
3.5 Conclusion
We conclude that both the structural transformation within the service sector and the la-
bor market regulation help understanding why European countries have lower service labor
productivity than the US. First, although the trend of labor allocation is similar in ser-
vice sub-sectors, the levels of labor shares are different. At the same time, the sub-service
sector’s labor productivity are remarkably different between Europe and US. European coun-
tries underperformed relative to the US in TFA (trade, food and accommodation) and TSC
(transportation, storage and communication) and outperformed the US in GO (government
and others, including health, education, personal and social services). Second, an extended
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version of Duarte and Restuccia (2010) is proposed in order to quantify the relative impor-
tance of each service sub-sector in the aggregate service sector labor productivity. In future
work, we will calibrate the model and use it to get the initial productivity levels of each
service sub-sector, and perform counterfactual exercises to analyse the relative importance
of each sub-sector in the aggregate service labor sector productivity. Finally, preliminary
empirical work suggests that labor market regulations such as increases in the notice period
are negatively correlated with service sector productivity and seem to affect relatively more
TSC and TFA (the most productive service sub-sectors).
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Figure A.1: Impulse-Response functions for other variables of interest for the benchmark
model where the Taylor rule targets CPI. Each graph shows percentage response of one of
the model’s variables to a one-standard-deviation shock in monetary policy.
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Figure A.2: Real Housing Prices and Rents from 1975 to 2015 and business cycles
extracted with a HP filter with parameter lambda set to 36000 and 1600 from housing
prices and housing rents, respectively. The higher lambda for housing prices is justified by
the fact that they have long cycles and are more volatile than output.
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Figure A.3: Impulse-Response functions for main variables of interest for the benchmark
model where the Taylor rule targets CPI (blue) versus alternative setting when Taylor rule
targets PCE (red) and composite CPI (yellow).
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II - Value Function Optimization
There is one individual state variable a and three aggregate state variables in the economy
, ρ¯. Since, the heterogeneity is iid, the subscript i in the value function can be removed as
the ρi integrates out.
V = max
rent,own
(Vrent(a; , ρ¯), Vown(a; , ρ¯)− ρi)
When the households decide to own a house, their problem is to:
max
c
Vown(a; , ρ¯) = u(c) + β(γVown(a
′; ′, ρ¯′) + (1− γ)V (a′; ′, ρ¯′))
Using the equilibrium condition (9) we have that:
Vrent(a; , ρ¯) = Vown(a; , ρ¯)− ρ¯ (A.1)
Hence, replacing this condition we have the following,
Vown(a; , ρ¯) = u(c) + β(γVown(a
′; ′) + (1− γ)(Vown(a′; ′, ρ¯′)− ρ¯′)) (A.2)
Vown(a; , ρ¯) = u(c) + β(Vown(a
′; ′, ρ¯′))− β(1− γ)ρ¯′ (A.3)
Given that ρ¯ is an aggregate state and is given to the household, it will not affect the house-
holds optimization problem. The same proof can be constructed to the renter’s optimization
problem.
When the households decide to rent a house, their problem is to:
max
cˆ
Vrent(a; , ρ¯) = u(cˆ) + β(γVrent(a
′; ′, ρ¯′) + (1− γ)V (a′; ′, ρ¯′))
Using the equilibrium condition (9) we have that:
Vrent(a; , ρ¯) = Vown(a; , ρ¯)− ρ¯ (A.4)
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Hence, replacing this condition we have the following,
Vrent(a; , ρ¯) = u(cˆ) + β(γVrent(a
′; ′) + (1− γ)(Vrent(a′; ′, ρ¯′)))
Which means that:
Vrent(a; , ρ¯) = u(cˆ) + β(Vrent(a
′; ′, ρ¯′))
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Figure B.1: Aggregate service labor productivity is value added per employee, whereas
service sub-sectoral labor productivity is value added per employee in each sub-sector.
Annualized percentage growth rates during the sample period (1978-2010) are given for
each country. The horizontal lines indicate the services sub-sectoral growth rates observed
in the United States, and the vertical line indicates the aggregate service sector labor
productivity growth rate of the United States.
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